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Department of Defense (DoD) is operating in an environment characterized 
by unknown adversaries, rapid technological change and a flat defense budget. To 
maintain technical superiority over its potential adversaries and do it affordably, 
DoD must further exploit the commercial industrial base. The use of "other 
transactions" provides one solution. This study was conducted to develop a 
decision model on when to use other transactions at DoD buying commands. The 
intent of this OT decision model is to provide the decision-maker with a 
framework that identifies key factors that should be considered in determining if 
an OT is appropriate. Depending on w~at the buying command is trying to 
achieve will determine which factors will be pertinent in the decision process. The 
researcher concludes that the business decision is c"entral to the OT decision. The 
other principal criteria in the OT decision process are nature of the product, non-
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The purpose of this thesis is identify principal criteria for the decision-maker to 
determine when to use "Other Transactions" (OTs). The researcher will develop these 
principal criteria into a decision model for when to use OTs in lieu of a standard 
procurement contract, grant or cooperative agreement. 
B. OVERVIEW 
In February 1998, Jacques S. Gansler, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology addressed how the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to 
transform the way it does business when he stated, 
These are exciting and chailenging times. Be:tween the geopolitical 
changes, the technological changes, the military changes and the 
budgeting constraints [DoD] is under, it is an area that does not lend itself 
to a 'status quo' posture. In fact, a dramatic transformation is required. 
[Ref. 1 :p. 1] 
The demise of the Soviet Union dramatically changed DoD's environment. This 
imposing, clearly identifiable -threat had shaped U.S. military· strategy, DoD's budget, 
DoD's force levels and DoD's weapon system designs. [Ref. 2:p. 3] With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the Congress and the President could no longer support DoD's Cold 
War budget, force levels or pace of weapon system acquisition; the Congress and the 
. President· mandated dramatic decreases in all three. [Ref. 2:p. 3] Declining budgets 
through the 1990s caused DoD to defer modernization of its weapon systems to sustain 
its downsized, but still substantial, existing systems and forces. With the emergence of 
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!lew threats, aging systems and "potential new technologies available to our potential 
adversaries on a worldwide basis," DoD must rapidly modernize its forces to address 
these threats and incorporate new technologies without increasing its budget. [Ref. 1 :p. 
1] 
DoD cannot accomplish these tasks without making significant changes in its 
acquisition system. Technology advances in the commercial sector, particularly in 
electronics and information systems, have greatly outpaced DoD's acquisition system. 
[Ref. 3:p. 2] Some studies have shown that fielding major weapon systems can take up to 
15 years using traditional contracting methods. [Ref. 1 :p. 2] This lengthy acquisition 
cycle time drives up the cost of weapon systems without delivering increased 
performance. DoD has to shorten its acquisition cycle time to capture the commercial 
sector's technologies, avoid delivering technologically obsolete equipment to its users, 
and to decrease its acquisition costs . 
. DoD is looking for alternatives to shorten its cycle time. The use of OTs is one 
method DoD is pursuing. Congress granted Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) the authority, under 10 U.S.C. 2371, to use "transactions othel; than 
contracts, grants or cooperative agreements in carrying out basic, applied and advanced 
research projects." [Ref. 4] DARPA has interpreted OTs to be a "distinct class of 
transactions outside the procurement and assistance categories" and not subject to Federal 
Acquisition RegulatiC?n . (F AR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) and the laws and regulations applicable to grants and agreements. [Ref. 5:p. 
35] 
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Freed from bureaucratic, time-consuming regulations, DARPA has been able to 
attract commercial firms, that otherwise would not do business with the Government, to 
engage in cutting-edge. technology. The use of OTs has provided DoD a method to 
collaborate and team with commercial industry through innovative, cost-sharing 
arrangements. These cost-sharing arrangements establish a financial level of commit-
ment between DARPA and commercial firms. These arrangements also allow DARPA to 
influence the firms' R&D efforts into "developing militarily useful, commercially viable 
technology." [Ref. 6:p. 1] Both parties benefit; the commercial firms benefit by being 
provided additional funds to contin~e research, while the Government benefits by getting 
access to technology that is "more affordable, always available and continuously 
improving." [Ref. 7.:p. 1] The benefits of using OTs have been evident at DARPA. 
What is less clear are the risks associated With the use ofOTs and ifthe'same benefits can 
be realized by DoD's major systems buying cotnmands. 
Congress originally limited the use of OTs to DARPA, DoD's central R&D 
organization. DARPA's successful implementation of OTA has encouraged Congress to 
expand thi,s authority to the Services. The Services~ effective implementation of OTA 
will be contingent oli prudent, sound business decisions. 
In this thesis, the researcher, first, identifies and examines the objectives of DoD ' 
buying commands in using OTs. Next, the researcher identifies.their decision criteria for 
selecting OTs over other contractual instruments. From there, the researcher examines 
the decision process to determine if the commands use a decision hierarchy and if any 
barriers exist limiting the use of OTs at their commands. The final part of the 
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researcher's analysis will examine the approval process for OTs at these buying 
commands. Applying this analysis, the researcher will develop a decision model to assist 
DoD buying commands in deciding when to use OTs. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Through literature research and interviews with DoD buying commands, DARPA, 
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and OSD personnel, the researcher 
identifies principal criteria used in the OT decision process. The researcher develops 
these principal criteria into a decision model on when to use OTs in lieu of a standard 
procurement contract, grant or cooperative agreement. 
D~ RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the principal criteria to consider in developing a decision model for 
determining when to use OTs? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
1. What are the essential elements of an other transaction? 
2. What policies and restrictions limit the use of other transactions? 
3. What are the essential elements of a decision model? 
4. What are the principal objectives of DoD major buying commands in 
using other transactions? 
5. What criteria did DoD major buying commands use to determine when to 
use OTs in lieu of other contractual relationships? 
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E. SCOPE OF RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is directed toward management personnel involved in the decision 
process for OTs. This thesis develops a decision model for determining when it is 
appropriate to use OTs over other contractual instruments, including standard procure-
ment contracts, grants and cooperative agreements. The decision model is qualitative in 
nature and intended to provide a framework for managers to make good business 
decisions in the use of OTs. This model is not intended to be a quantitative model. 
In identifying the decision criteria for OTs, the researcher has interviewed ten 
DoD buying commands. The interviews were conducted with decision-makers in the OT 
process, including Directors of Contracting, Pro,curing Contracting Officers and legal 
counsel. 
This researcher assumes that the' reader has a basic understanding of DoD's 
acquisition process. 
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A comprehensive review of the available literature was conducted using the Naval 
Postgraduate School (Knox) Library, the Systems Management Acquisition Library and 
the Internet. The literature review included: (1) Professional journals and periodicals; (2) 
Research reports published by the Naval Postgraduate School; (3) DoD Publications and 
Guidance; (4) Government audit reports; (5) United States Code and (6) Internet web 
sites. 
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Personal and telephone interviews were conducted with Government contracting, 
legal and policy personnel. The interview questions are found in Chapter IV. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I identifies the focus and purpose of the thesis, including the primary and 
secondary research questions. 
Chapter II discusses the DoD environment from which OTs originated, reviews 
the legislative history of OTs and examines what, why and how you use OTs. 
Chaptet III identifies and discusses two types of decision models: the Rational 
Decision Model and the Descriptive Decision Model. The final part of the chapter 
discusses the decision process of selecting contract type. 
Chapter IV presents and analyzes the data collected in the personal and phone 
interviews. The chapter presents the intent of the interview process, a description of the 
interview methodology, a categorization of the results and the researcher's analysis. 
Chapter V uses the decision framework provided in Chapter III with the data 
collected in Chapter IV to develop a decision model on when to use OTs. 
. Chapter VI presents' the conclusions and recommendations generated by this 
research. The research questions are answered and areas for future research in OTs are 
identified. 
6 
II. "OTHER TRANSACTIONS" BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader sufficient background 
infonnation into other transactions (OTs). This background infonnation fonns a 
framework around which a decision-model on when to use OTs is developed. The 
chapter is divided into five parts. The first part discusses the Department of Defense 
(DoD) environment from which OT's originated. Next, the legislative history of OTs is 
provided. The final three parts identify what, why and how OTs are used. 
This researcher recommends reading two recent research efforts conducted at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) on OTs. These theses have provided much of the 
background infonnation foi this thesis. Each focused on a specific area of OTs. Howell 
studied if DoD could use OTs in lieu of the standard procurement system to more 
effectively apply commercial Research and Development (R&D) efforts to military 
systems. [Ref. 8] Slade's thesis researched ot use in prototype development. [Ref. 9] 
. Specifically, he 'examined the 1997 Commercial Operations, and Support 'Savings 
Initiative (COSSI) and identified what benefits and limitations contractors perceived 
using OTs. 
B. DOD ENVIRONMENT 
'Before examining OTs, the reader must first understand the environment from 
which they originated. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, DoD is operating in a new 
environment, an environment characterized by decreasing force levels and budgets, yet 
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riddled with uncertainties and unknowns. [Ref. 3:p. 1] To operate in this new 
environment DoD made substantial changes in its strategy and warfighting doctrine. 
[Ref. 3 :p. 1] 
Joint Vision 2010 is DoD's new strategy to confront emerging threats in the 21 SI 
centW)'. [Ref. 10] A central tenet of this strategy is technical superiority over potential 
adversaries. ,[Ref. 3 :p. 1] 
Critical [technological] advances will have enormous impact on all military 
forces. Failure to understand and adapt could lead today's militaries into premature 
obsolescence and greatly increase the risks that such forces will be incapable of effective 
operations against forces with high techllology. [Ref. lO:p. 11] 
Technological superiority poses serious concerns to DoD. First, DoD's acquisi-
tion system is not keeping up with changes in technology. Technology is changing so 
fast, particularly in electronics and information systems, that DoD is often fielding 
technologically obsolete weapon systems. [Ref. 11 :p. 2] Second, potential adversaries 
are abie to integrate current technology into their weapon and information systems 
because they lack a cumbersome acquisition infrastructure. [Ref. 12:p. 7] Larry Lynn, 
Deputy Under Secretary of'Defense for Advanced Technology (DUSD (AT», testified to 
the House Armed Services Committee, 
Our prospective adversaries are able to obtain an unlimited amount of 
. modem equipment on the open market and therefore able to field at 
commercial rates of perhaps three to five years. [Ref. 3:p. 3] 
Another major concern for DoD is the dramatic decline in the defense budget. 
DoD has seen its budgets decline significantly since the 1980's. In constant dollars, DoD 
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procurement outlays in Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 were 52% smaller than 1987 levels. [Ref. 
13 :p. 2] With a smaller budget, DoD needs to get the most out of its limited resources. 
These concerns fueled changes in how DoD does R&D and acquisition. With 
fewer R&D resources, DoD requires a coordinated R&D plan between the Services to use 
limited resources for the most promising R&D efforts, and to prevent duplication 
between the Services. For the first time, a Defense and Science Technology Strategy 
emerged to identify DoD's science and technology objectives and priorities. [Ref. 3:p. 1] 
The objectives and priorities identified within the strategy were threefold: to identify and 
exploit technologies with both a military and commercial application, to get technology 
in the hands of the warfighter more quickly and to increase affordability of DoD's 
weapon systems. [Ref. 3:pp. 1-3] These objectives and priorities are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
1. Defense and Science Technology Strategy 
Q. Dual-Use Technology 
A critical component of the Defense Science and Technology Strategy is 
to identify and make better use of technology that has both commercial and defense 
applications, commonly referred to as dual-use technology. [Ref. 3:p. 1] Rapid, 
technological advances have been made in the commercial sector. DoD can no longer 
ignore this fact and must find a w~y to access and influence these commercial 
technological breakthroughs into dual-use technologies. [Ref. 12:p. 9] The Director for 
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), Ms. Anita Jones, cited the purpose for 
dual-use technology. 
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One key reason for investing in dual-use is that as the procurement budget 
goes down, so does the amount of money the industry is investing in 
defense research and development. In areas such as electronics, industry is 
already investing more in R&D money than the Government, and for 
national security reasons, we need to have access to that technology. [Ref. 
3:p.2] 
Through the use of OTs, DoD has established one way to access 
commercial finns developing technologies that could be converted into dual-use. [Ref. 
5:p.37] 
h. Technology Demonstrations 
A second major component to the Defense Science and Technology 
Strategy is to get technology in the hands of the warfighter more quickly through the use 
of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). [Ref. 3:p. 3] DoD 
currently fields major weapon systems in around 13 to 15 years. [Ref. 1 :p. 2] "With 
electronic products now often out of date in 18 months, we can no longer afford to 
maintain our existing deployment cycle." [Ref. 1 :p. 2] Larry Lynn has voiced in 
Congressional Testimony similar concerns about DoD's acquisition system. 
If We don't change our ways, we are doomed to perpetual equipment 
obsolescence in critical areas such as electronics and infonnation-intensive 
concepts. [Ref. 3:p. 3] 
ACTDs bring the acquisition and operational communities together to 
identify significant military requirements that can be met with today's technology. [Ref. 
14] ACTDs allow DoD to quickly fi~ld prototypes in an operational environment for 
testing. This "fly before you buy" c ;ept mitigates risk by allowing the warfighter to 
validate the perfonnance of the prototype before committing resources and time to 
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acquire new systems. [Ref. 14] ACTDsare executed through OTs. The use of OTs 
provides DoD flexibility to rapidly award prototype projects without having to go 
through DoD's acquisitio,n milestone process. [Ref. 5:p. 34] 
c. Technology and Affordability 
The third component in this strategy recognizes the fiscal realities 
confronting DoD. With smaller budgets, DoD has to find ways to reduce the costs of its 
weapon systems. [Ref. 3:p. 3] Technology should not only be used to enhance 
performance, but to increase affordabiIity., One of the ways for DoD to maximize its 
resources is to elevate the importance of cost. Cost traditionally has been a lower priority 
than performance and schedule. DoD can no longer afford this view. [Ref. 15:p. 2] DoD 
Directive 5000.1 now requires cost to be treated as an independent variable (CAIV). 
Program Managers must trade-off performance and schedule against cost objectives; 
[Ref. 16: 2.5.2.4(c)] 
The use of OTs brings technology and affordability together by expanding 
the industrial base through the entry of non-traditional defense contractors. [Ref. 3 :p. 3] 
Through the integration of the military and commercial industrial bases, DoD can reap 
the benefits of production economies of scale and access state-of-the-art technology. 
[Ref. 3:p. 1] 
As DoD is significantly revising how it does R&D, DoD must also 
fundamentally reform its acquisition system to take advantage of dual-use opportunities, 
ACTDs and affordability constraints. 
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2. Acquisition Reform 
The intent of the latest wave of acquisition refonn is to change "what we buy and 
, 
how we buy it." [Ref. 1 :p. 1] Acquisition Refonn has brought about positive changes in 
DoD's acquisition system, but there is still more to do. DoD's acquisition system still 
"costs too much, takes too long and most importantly falls below desired quality and 
perfonnance." [Ref. l:p. 1] In 1993, Ms. Colleen Preston, fonner Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition Refonn (USD(AR», recognized the need to make fundamental 
changes in DoD acquisition to reflect the dynamic advances in technology and the 
shrinking defense budget. 
The world is a changing place and the challenges facing DoD are 
fundamentally different than they were even five years ago.... It is not 
enough to improve the existing system, we need a fundamental rethinking 
and reinvention of the acquisition system if we are to be able to respond to 
the demands of the market. [Ref. 17:p. 4] . 
One of the ways DoD is "fundamentally rethinking the acquisition system" is 
through the use of OTs. Acquisition Refonn created the environment for OTs to emerge. 
In the remaining parts of this chapter, the researcher examines the legislative history of 
OTs and what, why, and how OTs are used. 
C. LEGISLA'rIVE HISTORY 
Authority to use OTs is derived from statutory provisions. A review of the 
legislative history of OTs will identify whom Congress empowered with OT A. The two 
primary pieces oflegislation that are discussed are found in 10 U.S.C. 2371 and Section 
845 of the FY94 Defense Authorization Bill. This part concludes with a brief discussion 
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?fthe Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), formerly ARPA, because 
of its significant role in the implementation of OT A. 
1. 10 U.S.C. 2371 
OTA was originally granted on a three-year trial basis to DARPA in 1989. [Ref. 
4] Congress has since made the authority permanent and extended this authority to the 
Secretaries of the Services under the FY 92/93 Defense Authorization Bill. [Ref. 4] 
The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of each military department may enter 
into transactions (other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants) under the 
authority of this subsection in carrying out basic, applied, and advanced research projects. 
[Ref. 4] 
2. Section 845 Prototype Authority 
Under the FY94 Defense Authorization Bill, Section 845, Congress amended OT 
authority to include prototypes that are "directly relevant" to weapons or weapon systems 
"proposed to be acquired". [Ref. 9:p. 11] 
The Director of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency may, under. the 
authority of section 2371 of title 10, United States Code, carry out prototype project~ that 
are directly relevant to weapon or weapon systems proposed to be acquired or developed 
by the Department of Defense. [Ref. 9:p. 11] 
Congress granted DARPA temporary authority to use OTs to engage in purely 
military prototype projects on a three-year trial basis. [Ref. 18:Sec. VI, p. 5] Congress 
has since extended and expanded this authority through FY 01 by granting OT authority 
to the Service Secretaries of the military departments. [Ref. 19:p. 35] and [Ref. 20] 
13 
Congress has made OT authority for research projects permanent and has 
extended the authority to prototype projects on a trial basis through FYOl. . Congress 
granted this authority first to DARPA. Only after DARPA's successful implementation 
of OTA for both research and prototype projects, did Congress extend the authority to the 
Services. DARPA has played an instrumental role in furthering the use of OT A and 
warrants further insight into this organization. 
3. DARPA 
DARPA is the central R&D organization for DoD. [Ref. 21:p. I] Its position is 
unique because its complements the Services' R&D efforts, but operates outside the 
bureaucracy. [Ref. 21 :p. 2] In Congressional Testimony, Larry Lynn, the current 
Director of DARPA, differentiated his organization from the Services' R&D arms. 
DARPA's most prominent role is to invest in the highest payoff 
technologies and military concepts ... DARP A is uniquely idea-driven and 
project oriented, in contrast to other agencies that are driven by formalized 
requirements and oriented around programmed investments. [Ref. 21 :p. 2] 
DARPA is intentionally small to instill flexibility. DARPA continually 
rejuvenates itself by turning over research programs and personnel. Programs average 
three to four years before either being turned over to the Services or canceled. Personnel 
turnover brings in fresh ideas from industry and minimizes entrenchment of ideas and 
policies. [Ref. 21 :p. 2] In an environment characterized by risk avoidance, regulatory 
rules and acquisition restrictions, DARPA's culture of taking risks is refreshing. 
DARPA has been a strong proponent for the use of OT A. As of 1995, DARPA 
has performed over 100 OTs. [Ref. 22:p. I] DARPA's experience with OTs has 
14 
provided, and continues to provide, the Services valuable lessons to adopt before using 
this authority. The next part of the chapter defines OTs and distinguishes them from 
other "contractual" instruments. 
D. WHAT IS AN "OTHER TRANSACTION"? 
Under 10 U.S.C. 2371 and Section 845 of the FY94 Defense Authorization Act, 
authority to use OTs has been granted to DARPA and the Secretaries of the Services. 
The plainness of the question belies its complexity because an OT is not clearly defined. 
As noted by Jde Dunn, DARPA's lead legal counsel, an OT is defined by what it is not. 
[Ref. 19:p. 35] 
An "other transaction" is not a standard contract, grant or cooperative agreement. 
[Ref. 19:p. 35] Standard contracts, grants and cooperative agreements are defined i~ the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). [Ref. 16] A standard contract is used to acquire 
goods and services for the direct benefit of the Federal Government, while grants and 
cooperative agreements are used to further R&D efforts for another purpose other than for 
the direct benefit of the Federal Government. [Ref. 16:Part 35.002] DoD traditionally 
limited grants to universities and non-profit research organizations to perform research. 
[Ref. 5:p. 35] DoD used cooperative agreements when there was a mutuality of interest 
between the Government and other party to develop dual-use technology. [Ref. 18:Sect' 
IV, p. 5] 
DARPA was involved in "advancing the state-of-the-art, demonstrating tech-
nology, establishing industrial capabilities and transitioning technology into actual use." 
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[Ref. 5:p. 35] DARPA needed an alternative "contractual" instrument to address these 
needs and access commercial firms. OTs became that instrument. 
OTs can be distinguished from standard contracts, grants and cooperative agree-
ments in that they are a "distinct class of transactions outside the procurement and 
assistance categories" and not subject to FAR, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DF ARS) and the laws and regulations applicable to grants and agreements. 
[Ref. 5:p. 35] The legislative language for OTs was intentionally vague to provide 
DARPA with maximum flexibility to use it when other instruhlents were not appropriate. 
[Ref. 8:p. 20] DARPA used OTA to attract commercial firms and consortia that were 
developing state-of-the-art -technology. 
The definition of OT, or lack thereof, did not handicap DARPA's use. DARPA 
used the definition of OT and the vague legislative language to its advantage to uniquely 
craft flexible OT agreements. As discussed earlier, DARPA has awarded over one 
hundred OTs. Since authority to use OTs was granted to DARPA in 1989, the enabling 
legislative language has not dramatically changed. [Ref. 23 :p. 5] DARPA has viewed 
the lack of changes as a positive sign, a sign that DARPA has correctly interpreted the 
intent of Congress. 
The Services interpreted the legislative language more strictly than DARPA. This 
stricter interpretation initially limited the use ofOTs by the Services. [Ref. 8:p. 21] The 
next part of the chapter examines Congress' intent in granting OT A and how the 
perceived ambiguity in the authority and definition of OTs shaped DARPA and the 
Services' implementation of OT A. 
16 
E. WHY USE "OTHER TRANSACTION" AUTHORITY? 
Using OTA requires an understanding of what the authority allows you to do, but 
also requires an understanding of what Congress intended when it granted this authority. 
Without an understanding of the spirit of the law, those empowered with authority may 
exceed or under use this authority. The purpose of this part of the chapter is to explore 
why Congress granted OTA and how DARPA and the Services' interpretation of this 
authority shaped their use. 
1. Statutory Intent 
Congress granted OT A to encourage DARPA and the Services to access the 
commercial industrial base. Congress originally granted this authority for research 
projects and then extended it to prototype projects. OTA is consistent with 10 U.S.C. 
2501, which states: 
It .is the policy of Congress that the United States attain national technology and 
industrial base objectives.:. through acquisition policy reforms that have the following 
objectives: 
1. . Relying, to the maximum extent possible, upon the commercial national 
technology and industrial base ... to meet the national security needs of the 
U~ted States. 
2. Reducing the reliance of DoD on technology and industrial base sectors 
that are economically dependent on DoD business. 
3. Reducing Federal Government barriers to the use of commercial products, 
processes and standards. [Ref. 24] 
Congress recognized science and technology (S&T) projects involved new 
technology, small start-up entities and short-lived projects that required flexibility and 
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reduced administrative burden. [Ref. 8:p. 19] Small firms or entities did not have or 
want to establish the financial reporting and cost accounting infrastructures Government 
contracts required. [Ref 23:p. 8] Congress established OTA to provide DARPA and the 
Services maximum flexibility to pursue research and technology efforts with commercial 
industry outside the traditional Government contracting regulatory framework (e.g., FAR, 
DFARS ... ). [Ref. 8:p. 21] 
Congress then expanded OT authority to include prototype projects. Congress 
intended for DoD to use the untapped commercial industrial base to inject current 
commercial technology into existing weapon systems (ACTDs) and to address rising 
Operating and Support (O&S) costs of its weapon systems (COSSI). [Ref. 9:p. 13] 
DARPA has understood Congress' intent of OT authority and used it as an 
opportunity to successfully 'engage with the commercial sector. The Services have used 
OTs to a lesser degree. The next several paragraphs will discuss DARPA's approach to. 
using OTs and some of its benefits. 
2. OTs as an Opportunity 
DARPA views the ambiguity in the legislative language as an opportunity to craft 
flexible agreements with commercial firms that make good business sense. [Ref. 8 :p. 20] 
Some firms, such as Hewlett Packard and Cray Research, have consciously rejected doing' 
business with DoD in the past because of demanding and intrusive Government 
regulations. [Ref. 25:p. 5] Intellectual Property Rights (lPRs) are the most commonly 
cited Government regulation that causes some firms to shy away from Government 
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business. The guiding regulation in this area is the Bayh-Dole Act. 1 [Ref. 18:Sec. IV, 
p.6] OTs provide DARPA and the Services the flexibility to negotiate IPRs. OTs can 
also provide a window of opportunity for DoD to attract non-traditional defense firms, 
influence R&D efforts and reduce life-cycle costs. [Ref. 15:p. 2] 
a. Negotiate Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
With OTs there is "complete freedom to resolve IPR issues." [Ref. 
18:Sec. IV, p. 6] The regulatory provisions found in the FAR and statutes concerning 
IPRs and how they are allocated in government-funded research do not apply to OTs. 
[Ref. 18:Sec. IV, p.6] However, DARPA does not concede IPRs haphazardly. Though 
the regulatory provisions, such as the Bayh-Dole Act, are not applicable to OTs, DARPA 
uses them as a starting point in the negotiations. [Ref. 9:p. 17] DARPA requires the 
other partners to supply a convincing argument why the IPR regulatory provisions should 
not be applied to their project. [Ref. 5:p. 36] 
h. Attract Non-Traditional Firms 
Through the use of OTs and cooperative agreements, DoD has been able 
to attract contractors outside the traditional defense industrial base. In' a 1996 study, 
GAO estimated that 42 percent of the 275 commercial firms that participated in one or 
more OTs or cooperative agreements were non-traditional defense firms. [Ref. 25:p. 5] 
For the 1997 COSSI, 37 percent of the 30 participants were non-traditional defense firms. 
1 The Bayh-Dole Act, Public Law 96-517, as amended, provides the Government's general policy 
regarding patent rights in inventions involving Federal funds. The Government's policy is to allow the 
recipient to retain title to subject inventions, but providing the Government with a nonexclusive, 
nontransferable, irrevocable paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United 
States any subject invention throughout the world. [Ref. 25:p. 7] 
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(Ref. 9:p. 77] By expanding the industrial base to include non-traditional defense firms, 
use ofOIs provides DoD access to state-of-the-art-technology. 
c. Influence R&D 
Access to state-of-the-art technology is important for DoD, but more 
important, is what DoD does with that access. DoD needs to take advantage of 
technological advances occurring in commercial industry to maintain technical 
superiority over its adversaries. [Ref. 28:p. I] Io develop affordable, advanced military 
weapon and support systems, DoD must shape and influence commercial R&D toward 
dual-use. [Ref. 3:p. 2] Ihe use ofOIs can provide a means to influence the R&D efforts 
of commercial firms. OIs for research projects require, to the maximum extent 
practicable, that the commercial entity contribute a 50 percent cost-share toward the 
research effort. The cost share provisions in OIs establish financial commitment, 
increase total research funding and provide tangible benefits for both parties. [Ref. 7:p. 
I] 
d. Reduce DoD's Life-Cycle Costs 
, Dual-use technology can also be used to make weapon systems more 
affordable. DoD must expand its focus beyond acquisition costs to the total life-cycle 
costs of its systems. "A major focus of our acquisition program is to reduce life-cycle 
costs of our existing systems." [Ref. 15:p. I] Both DARPA and the Services have 
pursued dual-use technology to reduce life-cycle costs through its COSSI and ACID 
programs. Both COSSI and ACID programs use OIs as its execution instrument. 
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COSSI provides DoD a way to reduce weapon system modification costs 
by inserting prototype kits with current, commercial technology into existing weapon 
systems. [Ref. 9:p. 13] The objective of COSSI is to reduce the O&S costs for DoD's 
weapon systems. 
ACTDs provide DoD a way to deliver current technology to the military 
user in the form of prototype demonstrators in substantially less time than the traditional 
acquisition system time. DoD can place the demonstrators in the hands of the user to test 
in an operational environment. [Ref. 3 :p. 3] "Time is the enemy of higher performance 
at lower cost" [Ref. 1 :p. 1] ACTDs provide the user better performance at reduced cost by 
using current technology and reducing acquisition cycle time. 
The use of OTs has benefited DoD by expanding its industrial base to 
include non-traditional defense firms, providing access to state of the art technology and 
influencing these contractors to pursue dual-use technology. Through the development of 
dual-use technology, DoD can achieve a central objective of its national strategy: to 
maintain technical superiority over its potential adversaries. Dual-use technology, as 
demonstrated in COSSI and ACTD programs, can also be used by DoD to reduce the life-
cycle costs of its weapon systems. 
Despite the benefits of OTs, the Services did not pursue the use of OTs as 
aggressively as DARPA. [Ref. 8:p. 21] The next several paragraphs examine why the 
Services pursued a more conservative approach to OTA· and identify some risks 
associated with using OTs. 
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3. OT A Limitations 
When OTA authority was initially granted to the Services, they did not 
aggressively use this authority due to the ambiguity of the language and the lack of 
guidelines on when to use OTs. [Ref. 8:p. 21] The Services interpreted the legislative 
language more strictly than DARPA. The stricter interpretation initially prevented the 
Services frpm using the authority because cooperative agreements could be used, and had 
been used, in the past to stimulate research by for-profit firms. [Ref. 26:Encl. (1)] 
Another deterrent to using OTs was the lack of guidance. Guidance for OTA was not 
issued until February 1994, two years after authority was granted. The Services also 
recognized some potential risks associated with using OTs. The primary risk was the 
potential loss of IPRs. The ability to negotiate IPRs was earlier seen as a benefit, but it 
can also represent a risk. OTs lacked the IPR safeguards provided by cooperative 
agreements. [Ref. 27] Another risk in using OTs is the ability for either party to 
terminate. The Services potentially could have nothing to show for their investment. 
[Ref. 8:p. 31] The next several paragraphs discuss how the restrictive language, lack of 
guidance and potential risks limited the Services' initial use of OT A. 
a. Restrictive Language 
The initial legislative language for OT A was interpreted by the Services as 
overly restrictive, in that OTs could "only" be used when a standard contract, grant or 
cooperative agreement is not feasible or appropriate. [Ref. 26:Enc1 (1)] The Services 
wanted to use OTs, but could not identify opportunities to use OTs in lieu of cooperative 
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agreements. In the FY97 Defense Authorization Bill, Congress relaxed the language by 
allowing DoD to use OTs even if other instruments are more feasible. [Ref. 26:Encl. (1)] 
h. COfJperative Agreements v. other transactions 
The Services have predominantly used "flexible" cooperative agreements 
instead of OTs to stimulate research by for-profit firms. [Ref. I8:Sec. IV, p. 8] 
Cooperative agreements are a form of assistance instruments whose purpose is to 
stimulate or support research and development for other than the direct benefit of the 
Government. [Ref. I6:Part 35.002] The Services have had experience in using 
cooperative agreements prior to OT A. being granted. The Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) was the principal user of this instrument. [Ref. I8:Sec IV, p. 3] 
Though cooperative agreements and OTs have a similar purpose, they do 
differ in three key areas. [Ref. 18:Sec. V, p. 11] 
1. Bayh-Dole Act applies. 
2. Patent Right Clause in CFR 401.14 applies. This clause 
prevents the prime contractor from obtaining any rights from 
sub con-tractor' s inventions under an R&D subcontract. 
3. Flow-down clauses CilPply. Depending on the dollar 
thresholds, certain certifications are required by law or 
regulation to flow down to the prime's subcontractors. [Ref. 
23:p.50] 
The Bayh~Dole Act is the primary difference between cooperative 
agreements and OTs. If the patent-rights provision is less restrictive than found in the 
23 
Bayh-Dole statute, then the agreement is an ~T. Otherwise, the agreement IS a 
cooperative agreement. [Ref. 28:p. 7] 
c. Lack of Initial Guidance 
When OT A was initially granted to the Services in 1992, the rules and 
regulations that contracting officers have come to rely upon were no longer applicable. 
The Services proceeded very deliberately limiting who could have this authority. 
"Because of the uncertain nature of OTs, the Services retained authority for OTs at the 
service major command headquarters." [Ref. 18:Sec IV, p.] Interim guidance for OTs 
was issued by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) in February 
1994. [Ref. 18:Sec IV, p. 8] Further discussion on guidance is addressed in the final part 
of this chapter. 
d. Risk to Intellectual Property Rights(IPR) 
Along with a lack of guidance, OTs were perceived by the Services to lack 
the IPR safeguards found ·in cooperative agreements. [Ref. 27] This perception 
contributed to selecting cooperative agreements instead of OTs. The Services, unlike 
D~ A, have a primary mission to develop weapon systems. [Ref. 27] Many of the 
research and prototype efforts the Services pursue are intended to enhance performance or 
reduce weapon systems' costs. [Ref. 15:p. 2] The patent-right provisions found in 
cooperative agreements protected the Government's interests. With OTs, the Services 
could, if not careful, negotiate away. its IPRs. 
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e. Ability to Terminate the OT 
OT agreeme,nts allow either the Government or the other party to 
terminate for convenience provided that (1 )written notice is submitted and (2)a reason-
able determination is made that the project's perceived benefits do not outweigh the 
expenditures. [Ref. 23 :p. 42] By providing the other party the ability to terminate, the 
Government is exposing itself to risk. The Services could potentially spend public 
money and have nothing to show for it. 
The Services need to be aware of both the benefits and potential risks 
associated with OTA to effectively use it. The restrictive language has been lifted and 
interim guidance has been issued for the use of OT A. The Services must exercise sound 
judgment and protect the Government's interests when using OTs. The final part of the 
chapter reviews what guidance and models the Services have provided on how to use 
OTA. 
F. HOW DO YOU USE "OTHER TRANSACTION" AUTHORITY? 
While starting with a blank sheet of paper enables both parties to craft a flexible 
agreement and eliminate onerous Government requirements, deciding what to include and 
exclude from an "other transaction" agreement is more difficult than one may imagine. 
[Ref. 29] DoD, under the auspices of DDR&E and Director of Defense Procurement 
(DDP), has issued interim guidance for OT research and prototype projects. DDR&E 
Guidance on OT for research projects is reviewed first, followed by DDP's Guidance on 
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or prototype projects. This part concludes with a brief discussion on the existing models 
for each type of OT. 
1. . DDR&E Guidance 
DDR&E is responsible for overseeing DoD's research efforts. [Ref. 30] DDR&E 
recognized there existed ambiguity, perceived or otherwise, in the use ofOTs for research 
projects. [Ref. 28:p .1] DDR&E issued Interim Guidance in 1994, followed by 
Supplements in 1997 and 1998. Guidance was not fonnalized initiall,y to provide the 
Services opportunities to test the provisions and determine which provisions were useful 
or if any needed to be added. [Ref. 18:Sec. IV, p .6] DDR&E Guidance for OT research 
projects is in the process of being formalized, but is currently pending resolution with 
DoDIG on audit issues. [Ref. 31] 
To encourage increased and consistent use of OTs by the Services and DARPA; 
DDR&E did two things in its 1997 Supplement: it established clear policy for the 
Services and DARPA to follow and it established a new class of assistance instruments, 
Technology Investment Agreements (TIAs). [Ref. 28:p. 1] TIAs are a class of assistance 
instruments that may be used to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research projects, 
when it is appropriate to use assistance agreements and the research is to be performed by 
for-profit finns or by consortia that include for-profit firms, partiCUlarly firms that 
traditionally have not done business with the Government. [Ref. 28:p. 2] 
a. Policy 
Under its 1997 Supplement, DDR&E established a three-prong policy to 
encourage the Services to use the flexibility granted by 10 U.S.C. 2371 to reduce the 
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administration burden, to craft innovative agreements and to request waivers of 
regulatory requirements if necessary. [Ref. 28:p. 2] 
DDR&E strongly encourages the Military Department and DARPA to: 
• Use flexibility in statute, codified regulation, and the 1994 DDR&E 
guidance to reduce Government-specific administrative requirements for 
assistance instruments. 
• Use "other transactions" authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2371 to develop 
innovative approaches to carrying out research projects. 
• Promptly seek waivers of regulatory requirements, if necessary. [Ref. 
28:p.2] 
Consistent with this policy, DDR&E established TIAs. DDR&E's 
objective in creating TIAs was to alleviate the confusion associated with OTs and 
increase its use. [Ref. 28: p. 2] 
h. TIA Guidance 
TIAs replace two instruments: consortium agreements, a type of OT used 
by DARPA, and "flexible" cooperative agreements used by the Military Departments. 
[Ref. 28:p. 2] 
DDR&E authorizes and encourages agreements officers, those authorized 
to award TIAs, to tailor the TIA to attract non-traditional firms in participating in defense 
research. [Ref. 28:p. 2] TIA guidance identified four principal factors to consider in 
using TIAs: nature of the project, type of recipient, cost-share valuation, program 
management involvement. [Ref. 28:pp. 5-8] The guidance required the project to 
advance or support research. TIAs were limited to for-profit firms. The recipients were 
expected to contribute meaningful resources to the project. The final factor to consider 
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was the level of program management involvement. TIAs would require more involve-
ment on the part of program management than aFAR-type contract. [Ref. 28:pp. 5-8] 
2. DDP Guidance 
DDP is responsible for developing, interpreting and publishing procurement 
policy for DoD. [Ref. 32] DDP has cognizance for overseeing DoD's implementation of , 
OTs for prototype projects. DDP recently issued draft guidance on prototype OTs. As 
with DDR&E, DDP is in the process of formalizing its guidance. [Ref. 33] 
The guidance is less of a "how-to guide" and more of "what-to-consider" guide. 
It addresses, in 16 pages, many of the things contracting officers consider under F AR-
type contracts: acquisition planning, price reasonableness, allowable costs, financial 
reporting, performance management, terminations, changes, disputes, protests, patent 
rights, and Government property. [Ref. 34] Much of the guidance provided by DDP is 
not unique to prototype OTs and could be considered for research OTs. 
One significant difference between prototype and research OTs, however, is the 
requirement for prototype OTs to develop an acquisition plan. Prototype OTs do not 
provide authority to enter into production. A ,standard procurement contract must ,be used 
during the production phase. A prototype OT should not be considered without an 
Acquisition Strategy outlining the transition from an OT to a standard procurement 
contract. [Ref. 34:p. 4] Acquisition planning should also include issues such as 
sustainment; test and evaluation; and competition. [Ref. 34:p. 4] 
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3. Model Agreements 
To assist in crafting an OT, model agreements have been developed for both 
research and prototype. OTs. Rather than recreate them in this thesis, this researcher 
recommends reviewing Howell's thesis, Appendix A for a Model Research OT 
Agreement and Slade's thesis, Appendix B for a Model Prototype OT Agreement. 
Models only provide a starting point in developing an OT. Each OT has unique 
requirements that must be considered in crafting an effective agreement. The agreements 
officer must use sound judgment and risk' management to determine what to include and 
not include in the OT. 
By issuing guidance, instead of regulations, DDR&E and DDP are empowering 
the decision-makers. DDR&E's policy for research OTs encourages flexibility, 
innovation and inquisitiveness. DDP's policy for prototype OTs is straightforward' and 
concise. Both policies were intended to encourage increased and consistent use of OTs 
by the Services. Agreement officers, with the guidance, models and their judgment, 
should be able to create an effective OT agreement. 
G. SUMM,ARY 
DoD is operating in an environment characterized by unknown adversaries, rapid 
technological change and a shrinking or flat defense budget. To operate effectively in 
this environment, DoD must recognize the changes and adapt to them. The source for 
technical innovation is the commercial sector. To maintain technical superiority over its 
poteritial adversaries and do it affordably, DoD must find access into the commercial 
industrial base. 
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The use of OTs provides one solution into the commercial industrial base. 
Congress established OT A to provided DARPA and the Services maximum flexibility to 
pursue research and development efforts with commercial industry without the traditional 
Government contracting rules and regulations. This freedom has allowed DARPA and 
the Services to negotiate IPRs, to attract firms that traditionally do not do business with 
the Government and to influence commercial R&D and prototype efforts into dual-use 
technologies. Dual~use technology, as demonstrated in ACTD and COSSI programs, 
provide the warfighter better performance at reduced cost. However, this freedom also 
introduces risks to the process by permitting IPRs to be negotiated away and allowing 
both parties to unilaterally terminate for convenience. 
The decision process on when to use OT A must weigh both the benefits and the 
risks of OTs. The decision-maker has been provided guidance and models on how to use 
this authority for both types of OTs, but ultimately the decision-maker must exercise 
sound judgment and protect the interests of the Government. The decision process is 
explored in the coming chapters. Chapter III discusses decision model theory and 
identifies three decision models: the Rational Decision Model, the Descriptive Decision 
Model and Contract Type Selection. 
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III. DECISION MODELS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with background information 
on decision-making processes. This chapter presents three theoretical decision models. 
First, it discusses a Rational Decision Model and identifies six principal steps in the 
decision process. Next, a Descriptive Decision Model is considered .. It builds on the 
Rational Decision Model by introducing the human element to the decision process. The 
final part of the chapter discusses the decision process for selecting contract type at 
Government buying commands. This decision model narrows the scope of the discussion 
to Government procurement. A discussion of each theoretical model follows. 
B. RATIONAL DECISION MODEL 
The purpose of theoretical decision models is to assist managers in understanding 
the decision process and how the decision-maker interacts with the process. [Ref. 35:p. 
114] The Rational Decision Model prescribes how a rational decision-maker should 
decide. [Ref. 36:p. 4] To establish a level of understanding on the part of the reader, the 
researcher defines the tern'ls rational and decision. Rational, as defined by Webster 3rd 
New International Dictionary, is having reason or understanding. Decision, as defined by 
the same source, is a determination arrived at after consideration. The Rational Decision 
Model; as shown in Figure 3.1, defines an optimal decision process. Six steps have been 
identified in the decision process: (1) Define the Problem; (2) Identify the criteria; (3) 
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~eigh the criteria; (4) Generate alternatives; (5) Rate each alternative; and (6)Compute 
the optimal solution. [Ref. 36:p. 4] 




Rate Each Alternative 
Choose Optimal Decision 
Figure 3.1. The Rational Decision Model [Ref. 36:p. 4] 
1. Define Problem or Opportunity 
First, determine what is the problem or opportunity. The remaining steps in the 
decision process rely on correctly identifying the problem. Incorrect identification will 
lead to a poor decision or the wrong decision. [Ref. 36:p. 4] Too often, individuals 
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identify the problem through the proposed solution, overlooking the big problem or 
identifying symptoms to the problem rather than the problem itself. [Ref. 36:p. 4] 
2. Identify Criteria 
Individuals generally have more than one objective when making a decision. 
[Ref. 36:p. 4] For example, a homebuyer would not consider just the price of the house, 
but also many other criteria, such as location, quality of the schools, quality of the house, 
proximity to work, etc. in making the purchase decision. In a Rational Decision Model, 
the decision-maker will identify all relevant criteria. [Ref. 36:p. 4] 
3. Weight Criteria 
After identifying the relevant criteria, decision-makers must determine the 
appropriate value for each criterion. The weighting of the criteria is dependent on the 
decision-maker's objectives. [Ref. 36:p. 4] To continue with the house example, a 
homebuyer, who is single and affluent, places a higher value on the quality of the home 
and the neighborhood than on the quality of the schools. Therefore, the homebuyer 
would weigh more heavily the quality of the home and the neighborhood. A rational 
decision-maker will know the relative value of each criteria identified. [Ref. 36:p. 4] 
4. Generate Alternatives 
The next step is to identify possible courses of action. [Ref.. 36:p. 4] Decision-
makers should invest as much time as possible exploring alternatives. This process is 
often curtailed too early because decision-makers feel time pressures, perceived or 
otherwise, to make a decision .. [Ref. 36:p. 4] By not devoting 'sufficient time to identify 
alternatives, the decision-maker may not identify the optimal solution. A rational 
decision-maker will identify all relevant alternatives. [Ref. 36:p. 4] 
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5. Rate Each Alternative 
Each alternative will most likely have both positive and negative aspects. [Ref. 
37:p. 108] The decision-maker must evaluate how each alternative meets the prescribed 
criteria. A rational decision-maker will accurately determine the effects of each 
alternative on the prescribed criteria. [Ref. 36:p. 4] 
6. Choose Optimal Decision 
Finally, a decision will be made based on the information generated from the 
previous five steps. The alternative with the highest expected value would be the optimal 
decision. [Ref. 36:p. 4] The rational decision-maker will accurately calculate the 
expected value and will select the alternative with the highest expected value. [Ref. 36:p. 
4] 
"The Rational Model prescribes how a decision should be made rather than how a 
decision is made." [Ref. 36:p. 5] For the Rational Decision Model to work, decision-
makers are assumed to: 
1. Define the problem perfectly. 
2. Identify all criteria. 
3. Precisely weight all criteria. 
4. Know all relevant alternatives. 
5. Accurately assess each alternative. 
6. Correctly calculate and choose the alternative with the highest perceived 
value. [Ref. 36:pp. 4-5] 
The Rational Decision Model provides a theoretical framework for optimal 
decision-making. However, decision-makers do not operate in a vacuum, but in an 
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environment with internal and external influences that shape their decisions. [Ref. 37:p. 
106] The next part of this chapter examines how human rationality and the environment 
affect decision-making. 
C. DESCRIPTIVE DECISION MODELS 
Descriptive decision models describe how decisions are made. Economist Herbert 
Simon, in his 1957 Nobel prize-winning work, suggested that individuals are bounded or 
limited in their rational capability. [Ref. 36:p. 5] Individuals are rational beings with the 
capability to make decisions, but are limited by their finite intelligence, memory and 
perceptive ability. [Ref. 36:p. 5] These limitations prevent decision-makers from making 
optimal decisions. [Ref. 36:p. 5] Yet, they make decisions in complex situations and 
environments. Research by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that individuals apply 
rules of thumb, or heuristics, iIi making decisions. [Ref. 36:p. 6] Heuristics allow 
decision-makers to cope with comfllexity in the decision environment. [Ref. 36:p. 6] A 
brief discussion follows on the use of heuristics and factors that affect decision-making. 
1. Heuristics 
Mintzberg, in a 1975 study of managerial behavior, found that managers tend to 
rely on their intuition rather than hard, analytical data to make decisions. [Ref. 36:p. 6] 
As managers gain experience, they develop heuristics, based ·on their experiences to guide 
their decision-making. [Ref. 36:p. 6] Heuristics are helpful as a mechanism for coping. 
with a complex environment, but their use can also bias the manager's judgment and 
result in making the wrong decision. [Ref. 36:p. 7] In an environment undergoing 
tremendous change, the use of heuristics could guide managers in the wrong direction. 
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Managers may need to approach decisions differently than they have in the past. [Ref. 
37:p. 115] Managers must be aware of the limitations of decision-making biases on prior 
experience. 
2. Factors Affecting Decision Making 
There are many factors that affect the decision process in an organization. Some 
of the major factors influencing managerial decision-making are shoWn in Figure 3.2. 
The researcher has selected nine of these factors for discussion. The researcher 
introduces two other major factors influencing managerial decision-making into the 
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Figure 3.2. Routine versus Non-routine Decisions 
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Routine decisions are decisions managers make in the performance of their duties, 
generally governed by an organization's policies and the managers' preferences. [Ref. 
37:p. 111] Non-routine decisions are decisions by managers to address unusual problems 
or situations. [Ref. 37:p. 112] Managers are responsible for making both types of 
decisions. However, non-routine decisions generally require managers to devote more 
time to evaluate the decision and require managers to think outside an organization's 
governing policies and regulations, by exercising creativity and good judgment. [Ref. 
37:p.112] 
a. Time A vailahle 
The time available for decision-making is a critical factor in the decision 
process. [Ref. 37:p. 113] As noted earlier, managers often feel time pressures, perceived 
or real, to make decisions. Before making a decision, managers should consider the 
importance, urgency and risk of the decision. [Ref. 37:p. 129] Urgent decisions require 
rapid analysis. For important and/or risky decisions, managers should take sufficient 
time to carefully evaluate alternatives and not rush to a decision. [Ref. 37:p. 129] 
h. Risk Associated with the Decision . 
Decisions all contain a level of risk. The magnitude of decision risk is 
dependent on how much an incorrect decision adversely impacts an organization. [Ref. 
37:p. 113] Managers should consider the risks of a decision prior to making that 
decision. 
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c. Written Guidelines 
Organizations provide differing levels of guidance for their managers to 
follow. Larger organizations tend to be more structured, with more written policy and 
guidance, than smaller organizations. [Ref. 37:p. 113] The degree of written guidelines 
by an organization can constrain the decision process. [Ref. 37:p. 114] 
d. Company Attitudes Toward Decision Making 
Organizations also differ in how they make decisions. Some organizations 
have a very structured or systematic decision process, while others are less formal. [Ref. 
37:p. 114] Managers must understand their organization's attitude toward decision 
making so their decision process is in line with management's expectations. [Ref. 37:p. 
114] 
e. The Manager's Personal Ability as a Decision Maker 
The manager's persopal ability as a decision-maker is one of the most, if 
not the most, important factors affecting decision-making. [Ref. 37:p. 115] Mintzberg 
found that managers often rely on their intuition or judgment rather than hard data to 
make decisions. Managers must be careful when they use their experiences to guide their 
judgment because their experiences could lead to faulty decisions. [Ref. 37:p. 115] 
Some shortc()mings with using experiences to guide the deciSIon process are: 
(1) Learning from experience is usually random. 
(2) Although we may h~ve experience, there is no guarantee that we have 
learned from it. . 
(3) What we learn from experience is necessarily circumscribed by the limits 
of our experience. 
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(4) Conditions change, and the past may not be a good indicator of current or 
future conditions. [Ref. 37:p. 115] 
Experience is helpful in the decision process, but managers must draw on 
their intelligence and resources within their organizations to improve their decision 
processes. [Ref. 37:p. 115] 
f. Tunnel Vision 
Tunnel vision is seeing a situation with mental blinders that restrict, 
consciously or unconsciously, the number of alternatives to be considered. [Ref. 37:p. 
116] Managers impose individual biases .that may result· in excluding worthwhile 
alternatives. [Ref. 37:p. 116] 
g. Previous Commitments 
Decisions generally are sequential in nature, in that, they build on prior· 
decisions. [Ref. 37:p. 116] Decision-makers find it difficult to view the current decision 
independent from prior decisions. This tendency escalates the current decision and 
makes it difficult to say no. [Ref. 37:p. 116] 
h. Implicit Favorites 
Managers have to be careful not to favor an alternative too early in the 
decision process. By favoring one alternative over others, the manager may 
subconsciously downplay the attributes of the other alternatives and reject a better 
solution. [Ref. 37:p. 116] 
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i. Framing 
Framing is the presentation of information. [Ref. 36:p. 48] In this part, 
the researcher will discuss how framing affects behavior. Prospect theory, developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), suggests that individuals change their behavior based on 
how the problem is framed. [Ref. 36:p. 55] Prospect theory repeals the theories of 
Expected Value and Expected Utility. Expected Value Theory suggests that an individual 
should select the alternative with the highest expected value. [Ref. 36:p. 52] Expected 
value is calculated for each alternative by summing up the product of the weighted 
outcomes and associated probabilities. [Ref. 36:p. 52] Expected Utility Theory suggests 
that an individual should select the alternative with the highest expected utility. [Ref. 
36:p. 54] Expected utility departs from expected value because it recognizes that 
. individuals place varying degrees of pleasure on each level of outcome. [Ref. 36:p. 54] 
Contrary to expected utilitY theory and expected value theory, how you frame the 
problem can shape the alternative selected. Both theories suggest that decision-makers 
would be indifferent to the framing of choices. [Ref. 36:p. 57] Prospect theory 
Glemonstrated that individuals are risk seeking'in situations framed.in terms of losses, and 
risk adverse in situations framed in terms of gains. Therefore, managers must consider 
the impact of framing in the decision process. 
j. Internal and External Environment 
The final factor discussed in this chapter is the in.fluence the environment, 
both internal and external, has on managers' decision-making. Within the internal 
environment, decision-makers must consider the firm's mission, corporate culture, 
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management style of upper managers, policies, employees and unions before making 
decisions. [Ref. 37:p. 58] The external environment is equally complex, requiring 
managers to consider the labor market, legal and political factors, competition, customers 
and technology in their decision process. [Ref. 37:p. 58] By understanding and 
considering the environment inside and outside the organization, managers can make 
better decisions. 
The purpose of both the Rational and Descriptive Decision Models is to 
describe the managers' decision-making process. The Rational Model describes the 
optimal decision process, while the, Descriptive Model describes a decision process that 
recognizes the limitations of decision-makers, both physically and mentally. Under-
standing the process. and how the decision-makers interact within the process, can 
improve their decision-making and lead to'better decisions. Decision-makers should use 
decision models as theoretical frameworks to translate theory into practice. The next part 
of the chapter discusses the how contract type is selected. 
D. CONTRACT TYPE SELECTION 
, The' purpose of this part is to familiarize the reader with the decision processes at 
Government buying commands, specifically the decision process of selecting contract 
type before considering the decision process for OTs. Two areas are discussed: types of 
contracts and decision criteria for selecting contract type. 
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1. Types of Contracts 
There are two basic types of contracts: fixed-price and cost-reimbursement type 
contracts. [Ref. 38:p. 213] A fixed-price type contract is an agreement between a buyer 
and supplier, where the buyer is obligated to make payment based on a price agreement 
between both parties, and the supplier is obligated to successfully perform within the 
terms of the contract. [Ref. 38:pp. 212-4] There are several fixed-price type contracts 
available to Government buying commands, including: firm-fixed-price, fixed-price-
incentive, fixed-price-redeterminable, fixed-price with economic price adjustment 
provision, fixed-price-level-of-effort-termand fixed-price~incentive contract with 
mUltiple incentives. [Ref. 38:p. 212] In fixed-price type contracts the supplier bears 
most of the financial risk of non-performance. [Ref. 38:p. 214] Along a financial risk 
spectrum, firm-fixed-price contracts represent the most risk for a supplier, where the 
supplier is responsible for successful performance, without adjustments to the contract. 
[Ref. 38:p. 212] If a fair and reasonable price can be established; and the requirement is 
well defined, then the Government buying command should select a firm-fixed-price 
contract. [Ref. 39:p. 13] 
Fixed-price contracts are generally the most preferred as they share a common 
element; the contractor guarantees performance of the contracted work as a condition for 
being paid by the Government. [Ref. 39:p. 10] 
The second basic type of contract is a cost-reimbursement type contract. A cost-
reimbursement type contract is an agreement between the buyer and the supplier that the 
buyer will reimburse the supplier for all allowable and allocable costs in the performance 
of the contract. [Ref. 38:p. 213] There are several types of cost-reimbursement type 
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,contracts, including: cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-award-fee and 
cost sharing type of contrac~, [Ref. 38:p, 214] 
Cost-reimbursement type contracts differ from fixed-price type contracts because 
the supplier is only obligated to apply his best efforts in the performance of the contract. 
[Ref. 38:p. 214] The buyer, in this case the Government buying command, assumes a 
larger share of the financial risk of non-performance. [Ref. 38:p. 214] Cost-reimburse-
ment type contracts should be used when costs to perform the contract cannot be 
estimated with a degree of certainty (e.g. research projects; concept exploration; 
development and testing). [Ref. 39:p. 10] A discussion of the decision criteria used in 
selecting contract type follows. 
2. Decision Criteria 
F or sealed bid procurements, Government buying commands ~e required to use 
either firm-fixed-price type contracts or fixed-price contracts with economic price adjust-
ment provisions. [Ref. 16:Part 16.102] However, for negotiated procurements, Govern-
ment buying commands are provided broad discretion in selecting an appropriate contract 
type, as long as the Government's interests are promoted. [Ref. 39:p. 3] The remainder 
of this part focuses only on negotiated procurements. 
Selecting a contract type is more than following a checklist. There is no simple 
formula for selecting the correct contract type for every circumstance. [Ref. 39:p. 3] 
Selecting the appropriate contract type requires judgment and expertise on the part of the 
Procuring . Contracting Officers (peOs) to evaluate the risks involved with the 
procurement and to encourage the supplier to perform efficiently and effectively. [Ref. 
39:p.7] 
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Selection of the best contract type will (1) provide for a reasonable allocation of 
risk between both parties, and (2) ensure that the contractor has the maximum "incentive 
to reduce costs and also to comply with the terms of the contract. [Ref. 39:p. 7] 
Figure 3.3 provides a flow chart of the steps involved in selecting contract type. 
The model identifies eight steps in the process: 
1. Analyze Market Research. 
2. Perform Risk Analysis. 
3. Estimate Risk Impact on Cost. 
4. Select Basic Types of Contracts. 
For Fixed-price contracts, go to step 5 
For Cost-reimbursement contracts, go to step 7 
5. Select method of ordering. 
6. Select pricing arrangement. 
7" Select fee arrangement. 
8. Document the File. [Ref. 39:p. 4] 
a. Step 1: Analyze Market Research 
Market Research is a process by which you actively collect, sort and 
evaluate information about a specific industry, product, commodity or commercial entity 
to make better procurement decisions. [Ref. 40:p. 39] Market rese8!ch involves an 
ongoing, continuous study of the marketplace. Some of the benefits of market research 
are: 
• Identify potential qualified vendors. 
• Determine alternate sources of supply. 
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• Establish fair and reasonable prices. 
• Refine user's statement of work. [Ref. 41 :pp. 44-5] 
The PCO should evaluate the data from the market research to determine if 
the data support the use of a fixed-price contract. [Ref. 39:p. 5] As discussed earlier, the 
Government prefers fixed-price arrangements because the contractor is required to 
successfully perform the contract to receive payment from the Government. The market 
research data should indicate whether adequate price competition exists, whether industry 
has the capability to perfonn, what was their past performance record, and if fixed-price 
arrangements are standard in this industry. [Ref. 39:p. 5] 
h. Step 2: Perform Risk Analysis 
An important element of contract type selection is the analysis of risk. 
Table 111-1 identifies ten risk factors to consider in selecting contract type. PCOs should 
consider both the Government's and the contractor's exposure to risk, determi~ng which 
are high and low. [Ref. 39:p. 5] By identifying the risk factors and risk exposure levels, 
PCOs can select the contract type that provides a reasonable allocation 'of risk for both the 
Government and the contractor., '[Ref. 39:p. 7] 
c. Step 3; Estimat~ Risk Impact on Cost 
Of those factors that have been identified as high risk, PCOs should 
determine which of those factors will significantly impact the performance of the 
contract. [Ref. 39:p. 7] If no risks have been identified as high risk, thePCOs should 
, ' 
determine if the aggregate impact of all the risks would have a significant impact on cost. 
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Assess risks of 
performance 
Select the basic type 
of contract or 
agreement 
Select the method of 
ordering. 
Select a pricing 
arrangement 
Select a fee 
arrangement. 
Prepare any necessary 
determinations and 
document the file. 
Figure 3.3. Steps In Selecting Contract Type [Ref. 39:p. 4-4] 
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[Ref. 39:p. 7] A firm-fIxed-price contract should be selected if the aggregate risk is 
insignificant. However, if the aggregate risk is significant, other types of contracts 
should be selected. [Ref. 39:p. 7] The selection should be based on the level of 
uncertainty, the impact the uncertainty could have on the total cost of the contract and the 
cost of contract administration. [Ref. 39:p. 7] The objective of selecting contract type is 
not to place all the risk on the contractor, but rather, to reasonably allocate risk to both 
parties in order to achieve performance of the contract at a fair and reasonable price. 
Table 3.1. Risk Analysis [Ref. 39:p. 6] 
RISK ANALYSIS 
FAR 16.104 
FACTOR Controlled By ANALYSIS 
Price Competition Market Effective price competition results in realistic pricing and a 
fixed-price contract is in the Government's interest. 
Price Analysis Government With or without competition may provide a realistic pricing 
standard that would result in a fixed price contract. 
Cost Analysis Government .uncertainties involved in performance and possible impact 
upon costs (labor, raw materials, plan and equipment, etc.) 
must be identified and evaluated so that a reasonable degree of 
cost responsibility upon the contractor can be negotiated. 
Type & Complexity Government Unique complex requirements usually result in greater risk 
of Requirement assumption by the Government especially when performance 
uncertainties or the likelihood of changes make it difficult to 
estimate performance costs in advance.' When a· requirement 
recurs or quantity production begins, the cost risk should shift 
to the contractor and a fixed price contract should be 
considered . 
Urgency of Government . If urgency is a factor, the Government may assume a greater 
Requirement proportion of risk or offer incentives to ensure timely 
performance. 
Period of Government In times of economic uncertainty, contracts for a long period of 
Performance time may require economic price adjustment terms. 
Technical Contractor Limited experience or need for capability or fmancial bonding 
CapabilitylFinancial -or fmancial assistance responsibility may require closer 
Respons. Government surveillance than is provided by a fixed price 
contract. 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Accounting System Contractor Other than flrm flxed price, the contractors accounting system 
should permit timely development of all necessary cost data. 
Required for FPI and cost reimbursement contracts. 
Concurrent Government If performance under the proposed contract involves 
Contracts concurrent operations under other contracts, the impact of 
those contracts, including their pricing arrangements should be 
considered. 
Approvals Government If performance under the proposed contract involves approvals 
by the Government at various stages (design, quality 
assurance, flrst article testing), then consider their impact. 
Subcontracting Contractor If extensive subcontracting is proposed, actual risks to the 
prime contractor should be selected. 
d. Step 4: Types of Contracts 
Earlier discussion identified two basic types of contracts: fixed-price and 
cost-reimbursement type contracts. Fixed-price type contracts are the Government's 
preferred contracting' type because it places the responsibility on the contractor .for 
successful performance. However, there are circumstances when the costs to perform the 
contract cannot be estimated with a degree of certainty (e.g. research projects; concept 
exploration; development and testing). [Ref. 39:p. 10] In those cases, a cost-
reimbursement type contract may be. appropriate. If a fixed-price type contract is selected 
go to step five and select method of ordering. If a cost-reimbursement type contract is 
selected go to step seven and select fee arrangement. 
e. Step 5: Select Method of Ordering for Fixed-Price Contracts 
For fixed-price type contracts, the most frequently used method of 
ordering is a definite-delivery, definite quantity method. [Ref. 39:p. 12] The peo has 
other options to consider under indefinite-delivery ordering methods, such as: indefinite-
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quantity, definite-delivery; indefinite quantity, indefinite-delivery; and a requirements 
contract. [Ref. 39:p. 12] Indefinite delivery contracts allow: the buying a"ctivity to 
maintain minimum stock .levels; the supplier to directly ship to the users; and flexibility 
in quantity and delivery requirements to meet the needs of users. [Ref. 39:p. 12] 
f. Step 6: Select a Pricing Arrangement 
After selecting ordering method, the peo must consider the appropriate 
pricing arrangement. As identified earlier, there are many different types of fixed-price 
type contracts. The peo should select the pricing arrangement that provides a reasonable 
allocation of risk for successful performance and incentive for the contractor to achieve or 
exceed specified perfonnance goals. [Ref. 39:p. 13] The next step for fixed-price type 
contracts is step eight, documentation. 
g. Step 7: Select a Fee Arrangement 
Selecting a fee arrangement applies only to cost-reimbursement type 
contracts. Under a cost-reimbursement type contract, the contractor agrees to provide his 
best efforts to perfonn within the estimated cost. [Ref. 39:p. 19] In general, a contractor 
is reimbursed for all allowable ,costs. [Ref. 39:p.19] peo should conduct a similar 
analysis of risk and incentives as conducted when detennining pricing arrange-ment, to 
select the appropriate fee arrangement. 
h. Step 8: Document the File 
For both fixed-price and cost-reimbursement type contracts, the peo must 
establish a contract file to document the decision process in selecting contract type. [Ref. 
39:p.24] For other than firm-fixed-price contracts, the peo must assure the contractor's 
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accounting system is adequate because the PCO is obligating the Government to assume 
a portion of the cost of perfonnance. [Ref. 39:p. 23] Documentation provides a written 
record of the obligations between the Government and a contractor and should stand-
alone, in the absence of the PCO, as evidence of that obligation. 
Government buying commands use two basic types of contracts: fixed-
price and cost-reimbursement type contracts. The starting point in the decision process is 
assessing the risks of contract perfonnance through market research, risk analysis and 
cost impact. The contract type selected should be one that provides a reasonable 
allocation of risk for successful perfonnance and incentive for the contractor to achieve or 
exceed specified perfonnance goals. 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter described the decision-making processes iri the Rational 
Decision Model, Descriptive Decision Model and Contract Type Selection. 
The Rational Decision Mod~l provides a framework for optimal decision-making. 
Six steps are identified in the process: (1) Define the problem, (2) Identify the criteria, 
(3) 'Weight the criteria, (4) Generate alternatives, (5) Rate each alternative, and (6) 
Compute the optimal choice. This Model provides an understanding of the basic steps in 
the decision process, but does not capture how decisions are actually made. The 
framework of the Rational Decision Model needs to be extended to recognize the human 
limitations of rationality. The Descriptive Decision Model maJ<es this extension. 
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The Descriptive Decision Model recognizes the bounded nature of human 
rationality. Managers operate in a complex environment with finite, personal abilities. 
To operate in this environment, they often rely upon heuristics. Managers should 
recognize the limitations of heuristics, understand the factors influencing their decision-
making and apply this knowledge to improve their decision-making. Managers are 
judged by how well they make correct decisions. 
The final part of the chapter discussed the steps involved in selecting a contract 
type at Government buying commands. The contract type selected should be one that 
reasonably allocates the risks identified between the contractor and the Government and 
provides incentive for the contractor to achieve or exceed specific perfonnance 
objectives. 
All three models describe the managers' decision-making process.· Understanding 
the process and how the decision-makers interact within the process, can improve their 
decision-making and lead to better decisions. Chapter IV presents the decision-makers in 
the OT process. The researcher interviews and analyzes the responses from Directors of 
Contracting, peos and legal counsel at DoD buying commands. 
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IV. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the data collected in the 
personal and phone interviews. The chapter is presented in three parts. The first part 
discusses the intent of the interviews. Next, it describes the methodology of the interview 
process. The final part of the chapter presents and analyzes the data collected from the 
interview process. 
B. INTENT OF THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
The purpose of the interviews was to provide sufficient data for the researcher to 
develop a generic decision model for DoD buying commands on when to use OTs. 
Directors, peos and legal counsel of DoD buying coinmands were the focus of the 
interviews. The researcher established five objectives in the interview process: (1) 
identify DoD buying commands' principal objectives of using OTs, (2) identify their 
principal decision criteria to use OTs over other contractual instruments, (3) rank the 
decision criteria in order of importance, (4) identify what barriers prevented or limited 
DoD buying commands from using OTs and (5) identify the organizational structure 
within the buying commands for authorizing OTs. 
C. METHODOLOGY OF THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
Personal and telephone interviews were conducted with 43 acquisition 
professionals at ten DoD major buying commands and at positions of policy leadership 
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within DoD. The researcher interviewed twenty-five PCOs, eight Directors of 
Contracting and five legal counsels of DoD buying commands. The researcher also 
interviewed five personnel involved in OT policy within DoD. The DoD buying 
activities included Office of Naval Research (ONR); Naval Air Systems Command 
(NA V AIR); Naval Sea Systems Command (NA VSEA); Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (SPA WAR); Naval Surface Warfare Center China Lake (NSWC-
China Lake); Army Communications Electronics Command; Air Force Logistics Center, 
Sacramento; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency (NIMA); and Office of Special Projects (OSP). The DoD policy 
activities interviewed were Defense Research & Engineering (DR&E); Defense 
Procurement (DP); Assistant Secretaries of the Navy and Army for Research, 
Development and Acquisition (ASN (RDA) and ASA (RD&A)); and Air Force Material 
Command (AFMC). To generate frank and open dialogue in the interview process, the 
interviews were conducted on a non-attribution basis. The respondents participated 
voluntarily in the interview process and their contributions are greatly appreciated. A 
listing of the interview participants is presented in Appendix A. 
D. INTERVIEW RESPONSES AND ANALYSIS 
1. Principal Objectives for Using OTs 
The researcher asked the respondents to identify their command's principal 
objectives in using OTs. The purpose of this question was two-fold: one, to identify the 
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:primary objectives of using DTs at DoD major buying commands and two, to determine 
if there was consistency among the Directors, PCDs and legal counsel. 
a. Data Presentation 
The data are presented in Table 4.1. The columns in Table 4.1 represent 
the different constituencies within the Contracting Directorate: Directors, PCDs and legal 
counsel. The rows are the different objectives cited by these three groups. The objectives 
are ranked from the most to the least frequently cited objective. The data reveal a clear 
distinction between primary and secondary objectives. 
The respondents identified four primary command objectives: 
• Good business decision. 
• Flexible terms and conditions. 
• Attract non-traditional firms. 
• Pursue dual-use technology. 
Table 4.1. Principal Objectives in Using OTA 
Reason Director PCOs Legal Total % 
Business 8 12 4 24 63 
Decision 
Flexibility 4 12 3 19 50 
Non-Traditional 5 9 4 18 47 
Firm 
Dual-Use 3 10 1 14 37 
Technology 
Improve 1 5 1 7 18 
Communication 
Political 2 3 0 5 13 
Streamline 2 2 1 5 13 
Process 
Other 0 2 1 3 8 
Total 25 55 15 95 NA 
Source: Developed by Researcher. 
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There were 95 total responses by the 38 Directors, peos and legal counsel 
interviewed. The most frequently cited command objective for using OTs was that it be a 
good business decision. Of the 38 interviewed, 24, or 63 percent, cited this objective. 
The next most frequently cited objective was instilling flexibility in the acquisition 
process through the use of OTs. Nineteen of 38, or 36 percent, of those interviewed cited 
flexibility as a command objective. Attracting non-traditional firms was cited by 18 of 
38, or 47 percent of the respondents. The last principal objective, pursuing dual-use 
technology, was cited by 14 of the 38, or 37 percent, of those interviewed. 
Several other command objectives were also identified, but were cited less 
frequently than the four primary objectives and were classified as secondary. 
• Improve dialogue between the program office and contractors. 
• Streamline the acquisition process. 
• Satisfy Political Pressure. 
• Gain better insight into the technical capabilities of contractors. 
• Reduce Operation and Support (O&S) costs. 
These command objectives were cited by less than 20 percent of the 
respondents. Improving communication between the program office and contractors was 
cited by seven' of the 38 respondents, or 18 percent. Using OTs to streamline the 
acquisition process was cited by five of the 38 respondents, or 13 percent. The next 
objective recognized the political influence encouraging use of this instrument. 
Satisfying political pressure was cited by 5 of 38 respondents or 13 percent. Some 
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respondents also identified gaining insight into the technical capabilities of contractors, 
thinking commercially and reducing 0&8 costs as other objectives of using OTs. These 
objectives were cited by three of the 38 respondents, or eight percent. 
h. Discussion 
As presented in Table 4.1, the Directors, PCOs and legal counsel 
identified ,four primary command objectives in using OTs: (1) be a good business 
decision, (2) instill flexibility in the acquisition process, (3) attract non-traditional firms 
and (4) pursue dual-use technology. Table 4.1 clearly shows a distinction between 
primary and secondary objectives. Table 4.1 also shows a shared perspective among. the 
Directors, PCGs and legal in identifying the primary command objectives in using OTs. 
However, while the three perspectives were consistent identifying the principal 
objectives, the three perspectives differed in, the orderilJ.g of these objectives. The next 
several paragraphs discuss each perspective. 
All Directors, or 100%, identified their primary command objective in 
using OTs was that it be a good business decision. Next, five of eight, or 62.5%, 
Directors cited attracting non-traditional firms as a primary command objective. Four of 
eight, or 50% of the Directors cited the flexibility in OTs in developing an agreement 
between the Government and contractors. To a lesser degree, Directors identified 
pursuing dual-use technology (37.5%), developing a closer relationship with contractors 
(37.5%) and improving communication between the Government and contractors (12.5%) 
as other objectives of using OTs. Directors also indicated politics influenced the decision 
to use OTs. 
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peos perceived the command's principal objective in using OTs was to 
achieve a good business deal. Twelve of 25 peos, or 48%, cited a good business 
decision as a primary command objective. peos equally cited flexibility provided by 
OTs to develop innovative agreements between the Government and the other party. 
Next, ten of 25 peos, or 40 percent, cited the pursuit of dual-use technology. The final 
principal objective, attracting non-traditional firms, was identified by nine of 25 peos or 
36 percent. peos, to a lesser degree, indicated that other command objectives of using 
OTs were to improve communication (20%), to streamline the acquisition process (8%), 
to increase insight into the technical capabilities of contractors(4%) and to lower O&S 
costs (4%). Three peos, or 12 percent, also suggested politics influenced the decision to 
use OTs. 
Four of the five legal counsels, or 80 percent, identified achieving a good 
business deal and attracting non-traditional firms. Three of the five, or 60 percent, cited 
flexibility as a principal objective. To a lesser extent, legal counsel cited other objectives 
which included: pursuing dual-use technology (20%), improving communication between 
the Government and contractors (20%), conforming to acquisition reform initia):ives 
(20%) and thinking commercially (20%). Figure 4.1 is a graphical presentation of the 
responses provided by the three groups. 
Figure 4.1 'presents the Directors', peos' and legal counsel's principal 
objectives for using OTs: The x-axis represents the objectives: business decision, attract 
non-traditional firms (NTF), flexibility (flexible), dual-use, acquisition reform (Acq. 
Reform), political, improve communication (comm) , gain insight into contractor's 
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capabilities, think commercially and reduce O&S costs. The y-axis represents the 
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Figure 4.1. OT Objectives 
c. . Ana/ysis 
The researcher found there was consistency among the Directors, peos 
and legal.counsel on what the command's objectives were for using OTs. Four primary 
command objectives to using OTs were identified by the respondents: (1) be a good 
business decision, (2) instill flexibility into a contractual relationship, (3) attract non ... 
traditional firms and (4) pursue dual-use technology. 
(1) Good Business Decision. All three groups identified the 
primary command objective of using OTs was that it be a good business decision for the 
Government. This objective is consistent with DoD's acquisition reform efforts to 
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empower DoD's acquisition professionals to use their sound business judgment, rather 
than prescriptive policies, to provide the best value goods and services to their customers. 
[Ref. 16:Part 1.102] 
There is not a simple formula for determining a good business 
decision else all business decisions would be good ones. Rather, the determination relies 
heavily on the judgment of decision-makers. Decision-makers must identify and 
understand their objectives; identify and evaluate alternatives to achieve their objectives 
and select the best, or most appropriate alternative. 
Within DoD buying commands, a good business decision 
considers what the customer wants and selects the best, or most appropriate instrument, to 
achieve that objective, while protecting the Government's interests. The use of OTs 
allow these buying commands greater flexibility to exercise their judgment in structuring 
a contractual arrangement with another party. OTs provide a flexible option to consider 
in the business decision. However, the use of OTs is not always an appropriate instru-
ment and other instruments, such as contracts, grants or cooperative agreements should 
also be considered. 
Although an OT is not a contract, a good business decision for the 
Government on the use of OTs should mirror some of the considerations made in 
selecting a contract type because both instruments aim to provide the best value to the 
Government. Some key areas to consider in selection of contract type were identified in 
Chapter III: market research, risk identification and risk analysis. Market research 
provides PCOs information on potential sources and industries' capabilities, and the 
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presence of adequate price competition. Risk identification reviews factors, such as price 
competition, price analysis, complexity of the requirement and urgency of the 
requirement, to determine which factors represent high risk to the Government. Risk 
analysis assesses those high-risk areas to determine their affect on cost or schedule 
performance. These areas provide pulse points for a PCO to consider in traditional 
acquisitions; however a PCO has to ultimately rely on personal judgment. These same 
areas could be considered in the OT decision process. 
While an OT does share some similarities with a contractual 
instrument, OTs also have considerable differences. As discussed in Chapter II, the rules 
and regulations that apply for contracts, such as the FAR and DF ARS, are not applicable 
to OTs. For example, both the Government and the contractors can terminate the 
agreement for convenience. The Contract Disputes Act does not apply .. The terms and 
conditions of the agreement are negotiable. OTs require PCOs to rely on their judgment, 
even more than contractual instruments, because of its unstructured nature. 
Is the requirement technically possible? Does the use of an OT 
make sense in this case? Is it being used for its intended purpose? To answer these 
questions, decision-makers must understand OTs, their benefits and associated risks. 
PC Os are not alone in this decision-process, but must use the expertise' and judgment of 
legal counsel, Directors of Contracting and Program Managers (PMs). 
Generally, OTs should be used to advance or support research and 
prototype efforts; OTs should not be used for production efforts. As identified in Chapter 
II, OTs are intended to increase DoD's access to advanced technology, particularly by 
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firms that traditionally do not do business with the Government; influence commercial 
R&D into dual-use R&D; and reduce DoD's life cycle costs for its weapon systems. 
DoD buying commands should recognize that OTs can be useful 
instruments to better serve their customers, but OTs do not have universal application. 
(2) Flexibility. The next most frequently cited command 
objective of using OTs was the flexibility OTs provided in structuring contractual 
arrangements. OTs provide flexibility to negotiate terms and conditions, patent rights 
and intellectual property rights. Of the three perspectives, PCOs felt the strongest about 
the flexibility OTs provided. The ~CO's emphasis on flexibility may reveal a perception 
that the existing acquisition process does not contain sufficient flexibility. PCOs, not the 
Directors or legal c,?unsel, are responsible for writing, negotiating and administering 
contracts. To do their jobs more effectively, PCOs need flexibility· in the acquisition 
process. 
OTs provide PCOs the ability to tailor the agreement and its terms 
and conditions, to achieve a beneficial arrangement between Government and the other 
party .. ors allow the Government to hold discussions· with individual firms without the 
threat of protests. Absent this threat, both parties are able to hold frank discussions about 
the military requirements and the capabilities of the firm. With a better understanding on' 
both sides, the end result is a better agreement. 
The other two perspectives also identified flexibility as a principal 
command objective, but did not cite it as frequently, percentage-wise, as the PCOs. In 
fact, the Directors cited flexibility third, behind attracting non-traditional firms. One 
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respondent suggested that in his fifteen years of operational contracting experience, the 
FAR has never impeded him from accomplishing any objective. The Directors' lower 
assessment of flexibility suggests that the FAR may be more flexible than given credit 
for, particularly with the current FAR P ART 15 rewrite. 
Another reason for the disparity among the Directors, peos and 
legal counsel can be linked to their responsibilities. The Directors and legal counsel have 
much different responsibilities than the peos. The Directors are responsible for the 
overall contracting process for their buying activity and are interested in the business 
case. Legal counsel are responsible for advising peos and the Directors on how to 
protect the Government's interests. These different responsibilities shape their views on 
acquisition process. The Directors and legal counsel are "not down in the trenches with 
the peos and would not share the same frustrations and limitations that confront peos. 
(3) Attract Non-Traditional Firms. Attracting firms that 
traditionally do not participate in DoD business was the third most frequently cited 
command objective. This is consistent with the intent of the enabling legislation. The 
'Directors and legal cited this objective second, behind the business decision, while the 
peos cited this objective as fourth, slightly behind the pursuit of dual-use technology. 
All three perspectives stressed the importance of broadening the 
competitive base to improve technology and reduce costs. One respondent indicated that 
comparrles, such as 3M, Lucent, Motorola and Kodak were willing to do business with 
the Government if they used OTs. Another respondent indicated that through the use of 
OTs the Government was able to access all of the firm's business units, not just the four 
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Government business units it had in the past. The use of OTs permitted the Government 
to access the technological advances in the firm's commercial business units. As 
discussed in Chapter II, most of the technological advances are happening in the 
commercial sector, particularly by finns that do not participate in DoD business. To 
preserve technical superiority over potential adversaries, DoD has to find access into 
these firms. , 
By attracting firms that do not traditionally participate in DoD 
business, DoD is able to access new technologies and innovative business practices. If an 
OT is only attracting traditional defense firms, such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, 
what new technologies and innovative business practices are you gaining from using an 
OT? Expanding the industrial base to include non-traditional firms provides DoD access 
to new technologies that are more readily available and less expensive. Competition from 
these smaller entities also should motivate the traditional defense contractors to improve 
their processes. 
(4) Pursue Dual-Use Technology. The final primary com-
mand objective of OTs identified by the respondents was the pursuit of technology that 
had both a military and com.rnercial use. PC Os, above the other two, cited this actually as 
their third most frequent command objective. Generally, PCOs interact with program 
management personnel more frequently than Directors of Contracting and legal counsel 
in the druly performance of their duties. With this closer bond, it is reasonable to 'see 
PCOs' perceptions are more in line with their Program Managers' (PMs) perspectives 
with regard to dual-use technology. PMs are required, by DoD 5000.2R, to explore 
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commercial solutions to fulfill their users' requirements. PMs are very interested in 
pursuing dual-use technology because it provides PMs with access to commercial 
technology for military application. In addition to increasing the technical capabilities of 
the system, commercial technology results in reduced cost because of production 
economies of scale and reduced risk because the technology has already been proven. 
[Ref. 15:p. 1] 
The researcher believes that pursuit of dual-use technology should 
be a primary command objective of DoD buying commands because commercial 
technology can expand the alternatives available to the PM; alternatives that may increase 
performance, reduce risk or reduce cost. If PMs are unaware of the commercial 
technology available, the optimal solution to enhancing performance, to reducing risk or 
to reducing cost may be overlooked. 
Four principal objectives of using OTs have been identified for 
DoD buying commands: (1) be a good business decision, (2) instill flexibility in the 
acquisition process, (3) attract non-traditional firms and (4) pursue dual-use technology. 
While the three parties diverged in the order of the objectives, the Directors, PCOs and 
legal shared a common perspective in identifying these as principal command objectives 
for using OTs. Commonality is important because all three parties, as well as the PM, 
will be involved in the decision process,on when to use this instrument. 
2. Principal Decision Criteria to Use OTs 
The researcher asked the Directors, PCOs and legal counsel within DoD major 
buying commands to identify their command's principal decision criteria in selecting OTs 
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over other contractual instruments. The purpose of this question was to identify how 
these buying commands decided when to use OTs. It differs from question one because 
the intent of this question is to examine the OT decision process within these buying 
commands, not identify the buying commands' overarching objectives of using this 
instrument. 
a. Data presentation 
The data are presented in Table 4.2. The columns in Table 4.2 represent 
the Directors, PCOs, and legal counsel interviewed. The rows are the OT decision 
criteria identified by the respondents. The criteria are ranked from the most to the least 
frequently cited criterion. The data reveal a clear distinction between primary and 
secondary decision criteria. 
The respondents identified five principal OT decision criteria: 
• Reflect good business judgment. 
• Attract non-traditional firms. 
• Pursue dual-use technology. 
• . Nature of the project. 
• Cost share arrangement. 
There were 154 total responses by the 38 Directors, peos and legal 
counsel interviewed. The most frequently cited criterion in the OT decision process was 
that it reflect good business sense. Of the 38 interviewed, 26, or 68 percent, cited good · 
judgment. The next most frequently cited criterion was that the OT enhance competition 
by attracting non-traditional defense contractors. 21 of 38, or 55 percent, of those 
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interviewed cited competition as a primary criterion. Pursuing dual-use technology was 
cited by 14 of38 respondents, or 37 percent. The nature of the project was cit~d by 12 of 
38 respondents, or 32 percent. The last principal criterion cited in the OT decision 
process was the cost-share arrangement, which was cited by 10 of 38 respondents, or 26 
percent. 
Table 4.2. Decision Criteria for When to Use OTs 
Directors PC Os Legal Total % 
Business 7 14 5 26 68 
Judgment 
Competition 4 14 3 21 55 
Dual-Use 3 10 1 14 37 
Technology 
Nature of the 2 7 3 12 32 
Product 
Cost Share 2 8 0 10 26 
Data Rights 1 2 3' 6 16 
Flexibility 1 3 1 5 13 
COSSI $s 0 2 0 2 5 
Gain 1 0 0 1 3 
Experience 
Total 38 40 47 154 NA 
Source: Developed by the Researcher. 
Several other decision criteria were also identified, but were cited less 
frequently than the four primary ones. The researcher has classified these criteria as 
secondary: 
• Data rights. 
• Instill flexibility in the acquisition process. 
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• COSSI Program. 
• Gain experience. 
These secondary decision criteria were cited by less than 20 percent of the 
respondents. Data rights issues were cited by six of the 38, or 16 percent. Next, 
flexibility in the acquisition process was cited by five of 38, or 13 percent. The final two 
criteria identified by the respondents were to take advantage of the COSSI program and 
to gain experience. 
Some respondents also noted that the decision to use OTs was often 
influenced by activities outside the contracting directorate. Dual-Use Science and 
Technology (DU S&T) Program, a branch of DDR&E, has determined at the outset that 
its projects will use either OTs or Cooperative Agreements. Some respondents have 
indicated that Resource Sponsors and PMs have exerted influence in the OT decision 
process. Even contractors, in their responses to Broad Agency Ann . uncements (BAAs), 
have influenced the OT dedsion. process by suggesting the us€" of OTs over other 
instruments. 
h. Discussion 
As presented in Table 4.2, the Directors, PC Os and legal counsel 
identified five principal decision criteria used in the OT decision process: (1) reflect good 
business judgment, (2) attract non-traditional firms, (3) pursue dual-use technology, (4) 
nature of the project and (5) cost share arrangement. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 show a 
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clear consensus among the three groups for the first two criteria, but less agreement over 
the remaining three criteria., 
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The Directors, peos and legal counsel all identified business judgment 
and attracting non-traditional firms as their top two criteria in the OT decision process. 
The next three criteria, however, did not achieve that level of consensus. Dual-:use, 
nature of the project and cost-share arrangement were, however, identified by the, three 
perspectives frequently enough to be distinguished from the secondary criteria. The three 
perspectives did not share the level of consensus they had in identifying the command's 
principal objectives. 
The identified criteria were very similar to the principal command 
objectives identified earlier. With the exception of flexibility, the three other objectives 
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coincide with the identified OT decision criteria. Intuitively, the decision criteria should 
be integrated with the command objectives in order to accomplish these objectives . 
. The identified decision criteria also were similar to the TIA guidance 
provided by DDR&E. Research OTs are a subset of TIAs. As discussed in Chapter II, 
DDR&E identified four factors that an Agreements Officer should consider in his TIA 
decision process: (1) nature of the project, (2) type of recipient, (3) recipient's cost share 
and (4) degree of involvement by Government program rj:'ficials. Three of the four 
factors clearly correspond to OT decision criteria identified by the respondents. The 
fourth factor, degree of involvement by Government program officials, was not identified 
by the respondents, but may warrant consideration. This factor pertains to program 
management officials and not to Directors, PCOs and legal counsel and may explain why 
it was not identified. OTs do require more time on the part of program management than· 
traditional research instruments through the attendance of quarterly reviews. [Ref. 
18:Sect. V, p. 5] The PCOs should determine if program management personnel are 
aware of their increased level of involvement and are willing to accept their increased 
participation in their research project. 
TIAs require more than traditional instruments [research contract or grant] 
on programmatic involvement before and during program execution ... program officials 
will participate in recipients' periodic reviews of research progress and will be 
substantially involved with the recipients in the resulting revisions of plans for future 
effort. [Ref. 28:p. 4] 
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c. Analysis 
The principal OT decision criteria identified by the respondents were: (1) 
reflect good business jU,dgment, (2) attract non-traditional defense firms, (3) pursue dual-
use technology (4) nature of the project, and (5) cost share arrangement. The five 
principal criteria are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
(1) Good Business Judgment. Consistent with a primary 
command objective of using an OT, the first decision criterion identified by the 
respondents w~s that it reflect good business sense. The Directors cited business 
judgment more frequently in percentage terms than the PCOs, 88 percent compared to 56 
percent. The disparity may be attributed to the fact that the Directors are responsible for 
approving OTs, while the PCOs are responsible for executing OTs. By being the approv-
ing authority within DoD' buying commands, the Directors will be responsible for 
defending their decisions. 
A good business decision will reflect good business judgment. 
The business decision within DoD buying commands considers what the customers want 
and select~ the' best, or most appropriate instrument; to achieve, that objective, while 
protecting the Government's interests. Selecting an OT is only part of the business 
decision. The decision process for an OT should be an element that contributes to the, 
business decision, but in and of itself, an OT is not a good business decision. 
The use of OTs allow these buying commands greater flexibility to 
exercise their judgment in structuring a contractual relationship with another party, but it 
must be used appropriately. Decision-makers must exercise sound judgment, based on 
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experience and guidance, to detennine that an OT is the appropriate instrument. The 
researcher believes that the business decision is the overall detenninant in the OT 
decision process. All the other identified criteria should flow into making the business 
decision. The other criteria identified by the respondents should be a subset of the 
business decision. Depending on what the command is trying to achieve, whether it is to 
attract non-traditional finns, increase access to commercial technology or reduce cost of 
its weapon systems, will influence the business decision on when to use OTs. 
(2) Attracting Non-Traditional Defense Firms. Broadening 
the DoD contractor base by attracting non-traditional defense finns is a major intent of 
the OT enabling legislation. The Directors (50%), peos (56%) and legal counsel (60%) 
identified attracting non-traditional finns as a principal criterion in the OT decision 
process. The business decision and enhancing competition were the only criteria to 
generate consensus among the three groups. A possible explanation for the level of 
consensus is the recognition of the commercial sector as the source of technological 
innovation. 
In the past, military research and development defined state-of-the-
art. Today that role has been assumed by the commercial sector, a sector that is no longer 
limited to the United States. A global industrial base has emerged; a global industrial 
base that DoD has to access to maintain technical superiority over potential adversaries 
and do so affordably. 
DoD buying commands have been challenged by DUSD (A&T), 
Jaques Gansler, to become "world-class" buyers. [Ref. 12:p. 9] DoD can no longer rely 
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on an industrial base specialized in defense, but must expand its buying power into the 
global industrial base. The use of OTs provides one access point into the commercial 
industrial base by bringing down many of the barriers that are associated with doing 
business with the Government. GAO has shown that the use of OTs has attracted both 
non-traditional and traditional defense contractors. [Ref. 25:p. 5] For DoD to capitalize 
on the benefits of accessing the global market place, it must, as a "world-class" buyer, 
attract the best firms in commercial industry. 
(3) Dual-Use Technology. The third principal criterion identi-
fied in the OT decision process was to pursue technology that could have both a 
commercial and military application. This criterion is consistent with the major 
command objectives of using OTs identified earlier. This criterion was cited by 
approximately 40 percent of the Directors and peDs, but by oDly 20 percent of legal 
counsel. The respondents from DoD buying commands that performed predominantly 
research OTs placed a greater emphasis on dual-use technology as a decision criterion. 
The pursuit of dual-use technology appears to be more relevant in research OTs than in 
prototype bTs because research,OTs are advancing or supporting commercial research, 
while prototype QTs are used to fulfill purely military needs. 
(4) Nature of the Project. Next, the nature of the project was 
identified by 32 percent of the respondents as a principal criterion. This criterion is a "go, 
no-go" decision. The project muSt be a research or prototype project for an OT to be 
used. Within the OT decision process, it appears that this should be the first criterion to 
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be considered. The decision-maker cannot use an OT, unless the project meet this 
criterion. 
The second step to consider under this criterion is to evaluate the 
intent of the project. For research OTs, the principal purpose is to support or stimulate 
research, not to acquire goods or services for the direct benefit of the Government. 
Prototype OTs have a very different purpose than research OTs. 
For prototype OTs, the principal purpose of is to develop "prototype projects directly 
relevant to weapon systems proposed to be acquired by the Department of Defense." 
[Ref. 4] Prototype OTs are instruments that are for the direct benefit of the Government; 
they are used to fulfill a purely military need. COSSI and ACTD projects would be in this 
category of OTs. 
The two types of ·OTs fulfill completely different objectives. 
Research projects using OTs are to advance research for everyone's benefit. On the other. 
hand, prototype projects using OTs are specifically for the military's benefit. Through 
enactment of permanent legislation, Congress has loudly endorsed OTs used for research 
projects. Their endorsement ofOTs for prototype projects has not been as vocal. An area 
that may warrant review is if these different objectives have had a dilution effect on the 
use of OT authority within DoD buying commands. 
(5) Cost-Share Arrangement. The. final principal criterion 
identified by the respondents was the cost-share arrangement between the Government 
and the other party. In line with DDR&E guidance, the respondents indicated that cost 
sharing would be an important criterion in the OT decision process, particularly for those 
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conducting research OTs. DDR&E identified the recipient's level of cost-share as a 
significant factor in deciding if a research OT is appropriate. Firms have to use their own 
capital toward the project to demonstrate their commitment to the success of the project. 
If the firms are unwilling to commit a meaningful cost share, then the Government should 
re-evaluate the project. The firms are indicating, through their lack of commitment, that 
they do no~ strongly believe in the merits of the project. If there is no commercial 
viability for this project, then DoD should pursue other projects that hold more promise. 
The legislative language in 10 U.S.C. 2371 requires, to the 
maximum extent practicable, that the recipient contribute, at least a 50 percent cost-share. 
No cost-sharing provision is found in Section 845, authority for prototype OTs. 
However, several PCOs that conducted prototype OTs, cited the cost-share arrangement 
as a major criterion in the OT decision process. Those peos indicated that the cost-share 
arrangement demonstrated a commitment on the part of the contractors and the potential 
for commercial spin-off application for the prototype. The FY97 COSSI also indicated 
that contractors were expected to share in the costs of Stage I. [Ref. 9:p. 16] 
The five principal decision criteria used by DoD buyi~g commands 
were: (1) reflect good business judgment, (2) attract non-traditional defense firms, (3) 
pursue dual-use technology, (4) nature of the project and (5) cost-share arrangement. The 
respondents had a clear idea of what the primary decision criteria should be for using 
. OTs. How they ranked the decision criteria are discussed in the next part of the chapter. 
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3. Ranking of Decision Criteria 
The purpose of this question was to detennine if there is a hierarchy of criteria in 
the OT decision process. The question was directed to the peos. 
a. Data Presentatioll and Discussion 
The data are presented in Table 4.3. The columns in Table 4.3 represent 
the peos' responses, in numerical and percentage tenns. The rows represent a ranking of 
the criteria from the most to the least frequently cited. The data reveal that a hierarchy of 
criteria for the OT decision process has not been established at DoD buying commands. 
Table 4.3. Ranking of Decision Criteria 
Criteria peos % 
None 18 72 
Non-traditional contractor 4 16 
Acquisition Reform 1 4 
Nature of Project 1 4 
COSSI 1 4 
Total 25 100% 
Source: Developed by Researcher. 
Of the 25 interviewed, 18 peos, or 72 percent, indicated that no ranking 
of criteria could be established. 
Four reasons were identified: 
• Each OT has to be reviewed individually. 
• . Insufficient number of criteria. 
• Influence of BAAs. 
• OT decision made outside DoD buying agency. 
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Twenty-eight percent of the peos believed they could rank the principal 
criteria in the OT decision process. The most frequently cited criterion was to attract 
non-traditional firms, identified by four, or 16 percent, of the peos. The remaining three 
peos identified acquisition reform, nature of the product and eOSSI as their top decision 
criterion. In the analysis section, the researcher focuses on why a majority of the . 
respondents felt that a hierarchy of criteria could not be established. 
h. Analysis 
The researcher found there was a general agreement among the peos that 
a ranking of OT decision criteria could not be established. Most prevalent, and in line 
with the business decision, was that each OT had to be evaluated on an individual case 
basis. Depending on what the command was trying· to 'achieve with the use of an OT 
would determine what criterion would be more important. 
Next, four of the peos were unable to determine a ranking of criteria 
because they only identified one criterion in their OT decision process. Two of the four 
respondents cited the Bayh-Dole Act patent requirements as their discriminator in the OT 
. decision process. These peos used Cooperative Agreements extensively and saw an OT 
as a default instrument if it became necessary to negotiate patent rights. The other two 
cited eOSSI funding as their criterion. The presence of COSSI funding permitted the 
activity to pursue a desired project if they would use an ~T. Though only one decision 
criterion was cited there did exist a decision process, a "go, no-go" decision. 
Another reason cited for not ranking the decision criteria was attributed to 
BAAs. The BAAs issued by DoD major buying commands generally specify that a 
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standard procurement contract, Cooperative Agreement or OT would be considered. The 
Government wanted to provide the contractors with maximum flexibility to determine the 
right instrument for them. Some of the respondents indicated that all contractors did not 
understand the distinctions between cooperative agreements and OTs. To effectively use 
OTs, both sides need to understand them. Educated in the benefits and drawbacks of 
using this, instrument, contractors can intelligently indicate which instrument is 
appropriate. DoD buying commands, prior to submitting a BAA, must determine that an 
OT would be an acceptable instrument. When using BAAs, the decision process for 
when to use OTs is made before the BAA is issued. 
The final reason cited for not ranking the OT decision criteria was that the 
decision was not the PCOs' decision to make. The decision was made outside the 
contracting directorate. Dual-Use Science and Technology (DU S&T) Program is one 
organization that makes the OT decision outside the contracting directorate. DU S&T has 
determined that its FY99 projects will use either a Cooperative Agreement or an OT. To 
accomplish its objectives of exploring dual-use technology and familiarizing the Services 
with using this instrument, DU S&T has made the OT decision up-front. The OT 
decision process should be 'placed where the decision is optimized, whether that is at the 
organization level, in the case of DU S&T, or within the contracting directorate. Each 
comr.",md will have make that determination on a case by case basis. 
The respondents have clearly determined that there should not be a 
ranking of the OT decision criteria. The OT decision process should be treated on a case-
by-case basis. However, there should be a starting point within the OT decision process. 
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The logical starting point of process is the nature of the project. If the project is not a 
research or prototype project, then an OT cannot be used. At this point; the other 
decision criteria are meaningless. If, however, the nature of the project is satisfied, then 
the relative importance of the other criteria will depend on the project. These decision 
criteria should form the basis of determining if an OT is an appropriate instrument for 
achieving the program objectives. The decision process is further explored in Chapter V. 
The next question identifies the policies and restrictions that limit the use of OTs at DoD 
. 
major buying commands. 
4. Barrier to Using OTs . 
The purpose of this question was to determine what barriers existed to using OTs 
and if they were internal or external to the buying command. The question was directed 
to Directors and PCOs. 
a. Data Presentation and Discussion 
The data are presented in Table 4.4. The columns in the table represent 
the Directors and PCOs interviewed. The rows represent the identified barriers to using 
OTs. The barriers are ranked from the most to the least frequently cited. 
The researcher has classified the data into two groups: internal and 
external barriers. The data do not reveal a clear consensus on which barriers limit the use 
ofOTs. 
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Table 4.4. Barriers to Using OTs 
Barriers Directors PCOs Total % 
None 1 9 10 30 
Regulations 1 6 7 21 
Unfamiliar 2 4 6 18 
Production 0 5 5 15 
Cultural 2 2 4 12 
Resistance 
Prototype Defn. 1 3 4 12 
Program 1 2 3 9 
Default Risk 
Total 8 31 39 NA 
Source: Developed by Researcher. 
The respondents identified two internal barriers: 
• Cultural resistance to change. 
• Lack of familiarity with using OTs. 
Four external barriers were jdentified: 
• Regulations .. 
• Inability to use OTs for production. 
• Prototype definition. 
• Program default risk. 
There were 39 total responses by the 33 Directors and PCOs. The five 
legal counsel were not interviewed. The most frequently cited response was that no 
barriers limited their use of OTs .. Of the 33 interviewed, 10, or 30 percent, cited no 
barriers. The next most frequently cited response was that regulations, either statutory or 
guidance, limited their use ofOTs. Seven of the 33 respondents, or 21 percent cited this 
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as a barrier. Unfamiliarity with an OT was cited by 18 percent of the respondents. The 
inability to transition fro11;1 a prototype to production under an OT was cited by 15 
percent. To a lesser degree the respondents cited cultural resistance to change, the 
definition of a prototype and program default risk, cited by 12 percent, 12 percent and 
nine percent respectively. 
As presented in Table 4.4, the Directors and PCOs did not establish a clear 
consensus on major barriers to using OTs. For the reader to appreciate the different 
viewpoints, some of the responses are paraphrased below. 
No limitations. OTs have many uses and were never intended to be 
limiting. 
The new PMs do not have the experience or enthusiasm to use OTs. We 
have had to educate the new PMs on the use of OTs as a possible way of 
developing technology. PMs need to become involved in the decision 
process. 
ACOs initially were unfamiliar with OTs. 
OTs cannot be used for production efforts. The OT agreement must be 
converted to a FAR-type contract when it is time to transition into 
production. Contractors are concerned that their cost share investment in 
the prototype project will not carry over into the production phase because 
the contract gets competed out in phase II. 
OTs involve breaking down paradigms. People are creatures of habit, 
changing their behavior is difficult. Contracting Officers are particularly 
risk adverse, concerned about DCAA and DoDIG oversight. OTs require 
a change in behavior, a hard thing to do. 
There is a natural reluctance to change. Under aFAR-type contract, you 
know what you are getting. "Old-timers" have shown a particular reluc-
tance to change. 
Acquisition Reform is supposed to change the way DoD does acquisition. 
Why is DoD using the old system? We have smart people at major 
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contracting agencies, why not use them and trust them to make good 
business decisions? 
What is the definition of a prototype? Does it have to be the first article of 
. production? Virtual prototyping in the computer field could challenge the 
traditional idea of what is a prototype. 
h. Analysis 
(1) No Barriers. Ten of 33 respondents cited no barriers or 
restrictions limited their use of OTs. Due to the relative newness of this instrument 
within DoD buying commands, the researcher was surprised by this response. Authority 
to use OTs was delegated to DoD buying commands in 1996. 
Reviewing the ten responses, nine were from small commands that 
engaged in cutting-edge technology and one was from a Major Systems buying 
command. The nine respondents saw OTs ·as another tool to support and stimulate 
technological activity, not as a limitation. These commands performed projects that 
could be described as high-risk, high-payoff projects. The culture at these commands 
differed considerably from DoD Major Systems buying commands. Small and flexible, 
these commands more readily embraced change and more heavily depended on the 
judgments of key acquisition personnel. The command culture found at the smaller 
buying commands appears to be the reason for identifying no barriers to using OTs. 
(2) Internal Barriers. The respondents identified two internal 
barriers to using OTs: (1) cultural resistance to change and (2) lack of familiarity with 
using OTs. Resistance to change was cited by four of the 33 respondents. Does this low 
response refute:: the perception that Government employees are risk-adverse? Perhaps 
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asking someone if they are a risk-seeker or are risk-adverse, will provide one set of data 
and observing his or her behavior will provide a different set of data. 
From Chapter III, risk-adverse behavior was found to be inherent 
in human behavior. "Individuals are risk-adverse and prefer certain outcomes of known 
behavior to uncertain outcomes of innovative behavior." [Ref. 36:p. 197] Changing 
behavior is difficult. OTs require a change a behavior within DoD buying commands. 
With its unstructured nature, OTs require decision-makers to rely more on their judgment 
than contractual instruments. 
The second internal barrier identified was the lack of familiarity in 
the use of OTs. DoD buying commands have not done very many OTs to date. In a 
FY98 DoDIG Audit, DoD buying commands issued 149 OTs from FY94 through FY97. 
[Ref. 39:p. 5] Excluding DARPA, DoD buying comffiands issued only· 61 OTs in three 
fiscal years. With so few issued, peos have not developed the requisite experience in 
using OTs. DU S&T wants to change that by exposing DoD buying commands to the use 
of OTs. Central to DU S&T objectives in using OTs is for the Services to gain 
experience and familiarity with OTs. For these reasons, DU S&T requires its FY99 
Projects to be awarded using either OTs or Cooperative Agreements. 
The use of OTs requires PCOs to learn a new process. Several 
respondents cited a large learning cmye to using OTs. The PCOs no longer have the 
FAR "armor" to protect the Government's interests. PCOs have to rely on their judgment 
to think through what to include in an OT to achieve the business deal while protecting 
the Government's interests. For the use ofOTs to be an accepted instrument within DoD 
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buying commands, the organizations have to become familiar with OTs. The researcher 
believes as DoD buying commands continue to use OTs the resistance to change and the 
lack of familiarity will be reduced. 
(3) External Barriers. The respondents identified four 
barriers to using OT A external to the organization: (l) regulations, (2) inability to use 
OTs for production (3) definition of prototype and (4) program default risk. The first two 
barriers are related and refer to the enabling legislation for the use of OTs. The third 
barrier identifies some difficulties defining what is a prototype. The fourth barrier 
identifies the potential downside risk of the contractor defaulting and the Government 
receiving nothing of value. 
Since the first two barriers are related, they are addressed together. 
Seven of the 33 respondents indicated that regulations limited their use of OTs. Five of 
33 cited the production restriction. Of those that said the legislative restrictions limited 
their use, the respondents did not say that the barrier was positive or negative. The 
researcher believes that most of the respondents were simply stating the existence of 
. statutory regulations for the me of OTs. 
The r'.uduction barrier, however, did generate comments from the 
respondents that indicated that it posed a negative barrier. One respondent, addressing 
the COSSI program, cited contractors' concerns of contributing resources in Phase I with 
the potential of not winning Phase II.' Under the COSSI, Phase I is the development of 
prototype kits and Phase Il Jroduction of the kits. When COSSI transitions into Phase 
II, the Government must convert the OT instrument into a FAR-type contract and solicit 
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for competition. DARPA has sought Congressional approval to extend OT authority to 
production to preserve the efficiencies achieved with OTs during the prototype project. 
Based on the FY99 Defense Authorization Bill, it is unlikely that Congress will expand 
the authority to include production. In this Bill, Congress cited concerns that DoD was 
not using OT A for prototypes responsibly and that DoD was skirting the acquisition 
system. [Ref. 20] It appears that these two barriers will remain intact for the foreseeable 
future. 
The third barrier external to the organization is the difficulty 
defining what is a prototype. ,A prototype is defined in the DSMC Glossary of 
Acquisition Acronyms and Terms as an original or model on which a later system/item is 
formed or based. ~he purpose of prototyping is to test out a model or concept before 
investing considerable resources into production. [Ref. 43] Prototype allows the 
Government to reduce its program risk by testing the prototype in an operational 
environment- a "fly before you buy" concept. The definition of a prototype leaves a lot 
of room for interpretation. One respondent questioned whether a prototype has to be the 
first. artic.1e of production. . Another respondent elected not to use an OT because the 
prototype too closely resembled a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) case. Within the 
computer industry, the line of distinction between a prototype and production becomes 
even blurrier. One respondent called it "virtual prototyping" .. The rate of technological 
advances suggests the distinction between prototype and production will continue to 
narrow. Therefore, this barrier will remain. 
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The final external barrier identified by the respondents was 
program default risk. Program default risk is the risk that the contractor will default on 
the ~T. OTs, unlike contracts, provide both parties the capability to terminate for 
convenience. [Ref. 18:Sect V, p. 7] If the contractor elects to terminate, the Government 
may have nothing of value to show for its expenditures. 
The cost-share provisions in OT agreements may mitigate program 
default risk. Contractors in many cases are contributing substantial resources to engage 
with the Government in research and prototype projects. The contractors make their own 
business decision when they determine a project is worth pursuing. To default on an 
agreement, the contractors, in consultation with the Government, must assess that further 
commitment to the project outweighs the benefits to be derived from the project. Ending 
projects that do not have future viability are smart· decisions for both parties. The 
Government needs to accept the fact that the project did not meet its objectives and move 
on to other projects with brighter prospects. 
Command culture contributed to the identification of barriers to 
using OTs. Small DoD buying commands, predominantly performing R&D, identified 
no barriers to using OTs. While at the larger DoD buying commands, barriers, both 
internal and external, to the organization were identified. The primary internal barriers 
were: (1) resistance to change and (2) l~ck of familiarity with OTs. External barriers to 
the use of OTs were: (1) regulations, (2) inability to use OTs for production, (3) 
prototype definition and (4) program default risk. As OTs become more accepted at DoD 
buying commands, the internal barriers and program default risk should be reduced. 
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However, the three remaining external barriers: statutory limitations, production 
restrictions, and prototype definition, will remain. Based on recent Congressional 
language in the FY99 Defense Authorization Bill, no major changes easing the 
restrictions in the use of OTs are anticipated. The rapid, technological advances in the 
commercial sector, particularly in the computer field, have blurred the distinction 
between a prototype unit and a production unit. 
5. Command Structure for Authorizing OTs 
a. Data Presentation and Discussion 
The purpose of this question was to determine what organizational 
structure was used by DoD buying commands in authorizing OTs. It is designed to 
determine if there was consistency among the DoD buying commands and if command 
culture had any impact in how OTs were authorized. 
Ten of the ten DoD buying commands reviewed had similar organizational 
structures for approving and signing OTs. The approval authority rested wi~ the 
Director or Deputy Director for Contracting. The Director or Deputy Directors in all 
cases delegated the execution of an. OT to either a Branch Head· or PCO. 
h. Analysis 
The researcher found consistency in the DoD buying commands' 
organizational structure for approving and signing OTs. Directors or Deputy Directors 
oversaw the business decision to ensureOTs were used appropriately, but delegated the 
actual execution to the PCOs or Agreement Officers. The organizational consistency 
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~ong DoD buying commands for OTs mirrors the judgment process used for FAR-type 
contracts. 
The approval and execution process for OTs at DoD buying commands, 
particularly the larger buying commands, is very similar to the contracting process at 
these commands. In both cases, the Government is seeking to achieve the best value 
contract/agreement, while protecting the Government's interests: For procurement 
contracts, PCOs are required to submit Business Clearances for approval, documenting 
their decision process. In reviewing the Clearances, the Directors or Deputy Directors are 
looking at the business case. 
For OTs, PCOs submitted a document to the Director, or Deputy Director, 
outlining why an OT would be the best instrument in this case and what benefits would 
accrue from the use of an ~T. Some commands used a Determination and Findings 
(D&F), while others used a Business Decision Document (BDD), but the objective of 
making good business sense remained the same. 
Smaller DoD buying commands did not have such a formal requirement in 
the business decision process. Often a .discussion between the Directors, legal an~ the 
PCOs was sufficient to complete the process. Though the process is less formal, the 
major players are still involved in the decision process: Directors, PCOs or Branch 
Heads, legal counsel and sometimes the PM. This informal nature is consistent with the 
nimble structure of a research agency. The culture does impact the process of approving 
OTs. Smaller commands, such as DARPA or ONR, use less formal procedures, but the 
approval structure of involving the Directors, PCOs, legal counsel and PMs is the same 
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for all DoD buying commands. Each perspective needs to be included in the OT decision 
for the Government to achieve the best business deal. 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, there is considerable consistency between the Directors, peos and 
legal counsel among DoD buying commands on what were their commands' principal 
objectives of using OTs. The principal objectives of using OTs are to: (1) be a good 
business decision, (2) instill flexibility in the acquisition process, (3) attract non-
traditional firms and (4) pursue dual-use technology. If DoD buying commands have the 
same objectives in using this acquisition instrument, then their decision criteria and the 
decision process should also be fairly similar. 
The identified principal decision criteria in deciding when to use OTs was, in fact, 
very similar to their command's objectives. The four principal decision criteria are: (1) 
reflect good business judgment, (2) attract non-traditional firms, (3) pursue dual-use 
technology and (4) nature of the project. Three of the four decision criteria matched up 
with the command objectives for using OTs. However, a ranking of criteria was not 
established at these buying commands. The researcher conciudes that the business 
decision is the overriding determinant in the OT process. Within th~ OT proce,ss, nature 
of the project is the discriminator, determining whether or not an OT can be used. The 
relative rankings of the other criteria will depend on which projects are considered. 
The decision process 'was nearly identical among the ten different buying 
commands. In all cases, the Directors or Deputy Directors of Contracts were the 
89 
approving authority for OTs. The PCOs were given the authority to sign the OTs and 
execute them. The only striking difference among the commands was the formal 
procedures in place at the Major Systems Commands and the informal procedures at the 
smaller buying commands. The fonnality of the process did not influence the decision 
process. The Directors, PCOs, legal counsel and PMs brought their perspectives and 
experience~ together to achieve the best business decision. 
The buying commands did identify barriers, external and internal, that limited 
their use of OTs. The internal barriers identified were cultural resistance to change and 
lack of familiarity with OTs. As these commands use OTs more frequently, these barriers 
will be reduced. The external barriers are outside the control of the buying commands 
and will most likely not be reduced in the near future. 
Chapter V uses the data collected in this chapter with the decision framework 
provided in Chapter III to develop a decision model on when to use OTs. 
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v. THE OTHER TRANSACTION DECISION MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the analysis from Chapter IV to the 
decision model framework identified in Chapter III to develop a decision model on when 
to use OTs at DoD buying commands. The chapter is presented in three parts. The first 
part discusses the intent of the OT decision model. Next, it considers the methodology of 
setting up the decision model. The final part of the chapter presents the decision model. 
B. INTENT OF THE MODEL 
Before discussing the intent of the decision model, it may be useful to first 
discuss, what is not the intent of the model. The model is not intended to be a step-by-
step, or "cookbook," process that delivers a decision as the output. This. type of model 
would correspond to a Rational Decision Model, which was discussed in Chapter III. The 
Rational Decision Model assumes that the decision-maker has perfect information; has 
correctly identified the problem; knows and has properly weighted all criteria; knows and 
h~ correctly evaluated all relevant alternatives; and selects the optimal solution. This 
type of model, ~ough helpful in describing how decisions should be made, does not 
reflect how decisions are actually made. 
In reality, decision-makers op~rate under imperfect conditions and have to make 
decisions without identifying all of the relevant criteria ,and alternatives. Decision-
makers rely on their judgment, judgment that is shaped by experiences and heuristics, to 
overcome the imperfect conditions and to guide their decision-making. 
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The intent of this OT decision model is to identify factors, primary and secondary, 
for decision-makers to consider in their OT decision process and recognize influences, 
both internal and external, to the buying command. Depending on what the buying 
command is trying to achieve will determine which factors will be pertinent in the 
decision process. This model does not supply the "right" answer, but provides the 
decision-maker with a framework that identifies key factors that should be considered in 
determining if an OT is appropriate. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The researcher reviewed the data provided by the respondents in Chapter IV to 
determine what type of model could be applied to the OT decision process. Would a 
prescriptive or descriptive model be more appropriate in this case? A prescriptive model 
describes how decisions should be made rather than how they are actilally made as in a 
descriptive decision model. 
From the literature review and the interviews, the researcher did not discover a 
pre-existing decision model on the use of OTs. Guidance was provided by DDR&E and 
DDP on the use of this ins~ent" anc Nas descriptive in nature. Both sets of guidance 
provided factors for . the decision-maker to consider, rather than instructing the decision-
maker how he should decide. The OT decision process relies heavily on the judgment of, 
the decision-maker. By issuing guidance, instead of regulations, DDR&E and DDP are 
empowering the decision-maker and encouraging flexibility and innovation. 
The descriptive nature of the guidance provided by DDR&E and DDP and the 
relative importance of judgment in the OT decision process led the researcher to conclude 
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that a descriptive decision model would be more appropriate than a prescriptive model. 
A descriptive decision model does not generally follow a linear pattern because there are 
different factors or influences affecting the decision process. Each OT brings a different 
set of circumstances to consider. 
From the data in Chapter IV, it appears that the business decision is central to the 
OT decision. The other identified criteria and influences represent factors to consider in 
the business decision. The final part of the chapter presents the OT Decision Model. 
D. DECISION MODEL 
The OT Decision Model, presented in Figure 5.1, revolves around the business 
decision. The researcher developed a model that identifies five primary and six 
secondary factors that should be considered in the business decision. The model also 
identifies three internal and three external influences on the buying command that may 
affect the OT decision. 
1. Primary Factors 
The five primary factors identified in the model were discussed in previous 
chapters. Four of the five factors were derived from the data provided through the 
interview process in Chapter IV. The fifth factor was derived from the Contract Type 
Selection Model in Chapter III. The five primary factors to consider in the OT decision 
process are: (1) nature of the product, (2) non-traditional defense filJTIs, (3) dual-use 
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Figure 5.1. OT Decision Model [Source: Developed by Researcher] 
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a. Nature of Project 
The decision-maker should consider the nature of the project. OTs may be 
used for the following projects: 
• Research project. 
• Prototype projects. 
The use of OTs is limited by regulation, to research and prototype 
projects. In order to use an OT for a research project, the decision-maker must also 
determine that the research project is for other than the direct benefit of the Government. 
If considering a prototype project, the decision-maker must also determine if the project 
does involve production, since OTs cannot be used for production efforts. As discussed 
in Chapter IV, one of the barriers to using OTs was the growing difficulty distinguishing 
between a prototype and production unit, particularly in the computer field. Before using 
OTs, decision-makers must define the type of project under consideration and the intent 
of the project. 
h. Attract non-traditional defense firms 
The decision-maker should evaluate: 
• Type of firms responding. 
• Number of firms responding. 
• Level of understanding of DoD requirement. 
What type of firms are responding to the Broad Agency Announcement 
(BAA)? One of the principal objectives to using OTs is to attract firms that traditionally 
do not participate in defense business. If large, traditional defense firms, such as 
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Raytheon or Boeing, are responding to the BAA, then perhaps an instrument other than 
an OT should be used. 
Second, the number of finns responding to the BAA should be noted. In 
granting authority to use OTs, Congress indicated that OTs should be used to enhance 
competition, to the maximum extent practicable. The evaluators should detennine if the 
use of an OT is attracting an efficient number of finns to promote competition. 
Third, DoD buying commands must do more than hope non-traditional 
defense finns are attracted to doing business with DoD. They must proactively promote 
to commercial industry what are the dual-use areas of interest for DoD. Decision-makers 
should ensure that the BAA was fully understood by commercial industry; this can be 
achieved by providing briefings on the dual-use areas of interest to commercial industry; 
educating these finns on the use of other transactions and cooperative agreements; and 
identifying what projects would not be considered acceptable. These actions may result 
in the buying commands receiving more responses, and better quality responses from 
industry. 
c. Pursue Dual-Use Technology 
The decision-maker should evaluate: 
• Commercial and military application. 
• Sufficient commercial demand. 
• Perfonnance improvements. 
• Reductions in life-cycle costs (LeC). 
96 
Projects should be evaluated for both military and commercial application. 
Projects with dual-use technology have two distinct advantages for DoD. When the 
technology is developed, DoD would be able to take advantage of commercial production 
economies of scale, thus lowering the cost of weapon system production. The other 
advantage of dual-use technology is that DoD can capitalize on the commercial sector's 
continuous efforts to improve its products. By pursuing dual-use technology, DoD can 
reduce its weapon systems costs and increase capability. 
Second, the evaluator should determine the level of commercial demand 
for this project. Sufficient commercial demand will indicate a base of commercial 
support that is not dependent on DoD business. Substantial commercial demand will also 
encourage firms to ~nnovate to maintain advantage over their competitors and reduce 
reliance on DoD business for their viability. 
The last two evaluation factors should be addressed together. To what. 
extent does this project improve performance or reduce the life-cycle costs of DoD's 
weapons systems? The purposes of pursuing dual-use technology are to apply 
commerci~l te~hnology to military weapon· systems to enhance their performance and 
reduce their life-cycle costs. Dual-use technology can achieve these objectives through 
the reduction of acquisition cycle time. DoD is able to access current technology in the' 
commercial sector, eliminating the time of developing its own technological infrastruc-
ture .. 
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d. Cost-Share Arrangement 
The decision-maker should evaluate: 
• Evidence of cost-sharing. 
• Type of cost-sharing proposed (cash, in-kind, other). 
• Timing of cost-share. 
To meet the statutory requirements for using OIs, the decision-maker 
should determine if the firms or consortia are proposing a cost-sharing arrangement. For 
research projects, the firms are required, to the maximum extent practicable, to contribute 
at least 50 percent of the costs of the projeCts. Although prototype projects do not have 
such a provision, cost sharing is encouraged. Cost sharing indicates that the firm or 
consortia are committed to the project and are willing to share in the project's risk. 
Before committing their own resources, the firms have done their own business decision 
analysis and concluded the project meets their objectives. 
Second, evaluate the type of cost sharing the firm is proposing. The type 
of cost share proposed will indicate the level of commitment by the firm. If the firm 
proposes using cash or direct costs, such as man-hours or material, as its cost-share 
contribution, the firm is demonstrating a strong commitment to the pursuit of this project. 
However, if the firm proposes using non-financial resources, such as wear-and-tear on 
machinery, the firm is indicating it is not fully committed to the project. [Ref. 28:p. 5] 
DDR&E, in its guidance for OIs, has identified some forms of cost-sharing that are 
unacceptable and should not be considered in the cost-share evaluation. Costs incurred 
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from prior research and intellectual property rights were identified by DDR&E as 
unacceptable forms of cost sharing. [Ref. 28:p. 5] 
Third, identify how and when the finn's cost-share will be applied to the 
project. If the firm suggests that its contribution come at the end of the project's life, that 
would indicate that the Government bears a disproportionate amount of the risk early in 
the project's life. [Ref. 44] That finn should not be evaluated as highly as other firms 
that suggest a more equal phasing of the cost-share. 
e. Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is one factor that was not identified by the respondents, but 
should be placed as a principal factor to consider in the decision to use OTs. The risks of 
the requirement should be identified and evaluated to assist the decision-maker in 
determining if an OT is the right instrument to fulfill the requirement. Some· factors to 
consider: 
• ~arketresearch. 
• Type and complexity of requirement. 
• Urgency of requirement. . 
• Data rights. 
~arket research should be an essential part of the OT decision process. 
~arket research provides the decision-maker infonnation on industry's capabilities, the 
adequacy .of price ·competition and the ability to do price analysis. This information 
allows the decision-maker to determine if the prices proposed are fair and reasonable. 
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As discussed in Chapter III, under contract type selection, the decision-
maker should identify and evaluate the risks of the requirement, such as adequacy of price 
competition, price analysjs, complexity of the requirement and urgency of need. Are 
there high-risk elements that may indicate that an OT may not be appropriate? The 
decision-maker should identify these high-risk elements and analyze their impact on cost 
and schedule. The determination of using an OT should include the recognition of risks 
and how these risks should be managed. 
Another consideration under risk analysis relevant to OTs is the data rights 
provisions. As discussed in Chapter II, the Bayh-Dole Act does not apply to OTs. 
However, the researcher has found through literature research that the starting point with 
OTs is to use the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act. The use of OTs allows DoD buying 
commands to negotiate the data rights to the agreement if it achieves program objectives' 
and is in the best interests of the Government. 
2. Secondary Factors 
The researcher identified six factors that should also be considered in the OT 
decision process, but not to the extent of the primary factOrS. Two of the six originated 
from the data presented in Chapter IV. The remaining four were found in the research 
literature. The six secondary factors are: Government involvement, flexibility, 
experience, personal ability of the decision-maker, tunnel vision and implicit favorites. 
a. Government Involvement 
The decision-maker should identify who and to what extent Government 
officials will be involved in the OT process. Two participants, in particular, warrant 
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discussion because their perspectives are important in developing a workable OT 
agreement. They are program management officials and Defense Contract Management 
Command (DCMC). 
DDR&E identified program management involvement as a factor to 
consider when using OTs for research projects. This factor should be considered for all 
types of OTs because OTs require more program management involvement during the 
formation of the agreement and during the execution of an OT. The decision-maker 
should determine if program management personnel are aware of the additional commit-
ment required for OTs and are willing to accept their increased participation in the 
project. 
Another Government participant in the OT process that should be included 
in the consideration stages of an OT is DCMC. DCMC has established four regional 
activities to handle the administrative function of OTs. By including DCMC in the early 
stages of the decision process of using OTs, DCMC could provide insight into the 
appropriateness of an ~T. If an OT is 'selected, DCMC could improve the overall 
agreement and reduce problems between the Government and the other party during the 
administration phase of an OT. 
b. Flexibility 
The extent of flexibility required to structure an agreement between the 
Government and, the other party should be considered in the OT decision process'. In 
Chapter IV, PCOs identified flexibility as a principal objective to using OTs. The use of 
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,an OT provides PCOs with the ability to tailor the agreement in order to achieve a 
beneficial arrangement between Government and the other party. 
c. To Gain Experience 
The newness of this instrument requires the PCOs to learn a new process. 
Instead of falling back on the FAR to protect the Government's interests, PCOs must rely 
on their judgment to think through what to include in an OT to achieve a good business 
deal with the other party. Using OTs to gain experience develops the judgment of all 
involved in the decision process: Directors of Contracting, PMs, PCOs and legal counsel. 
One of the guiding principles of Acquisition Reform is to rely more on the judgment of 
DoD's acquisition professionals. DoD buying organizations must be willing to extend 
themselves to use OTs and rely on the judgments of their Directors, PCOs, PMs and legal 
counsel to make the right decisions. 
The next three factors were identified in the research literature. The 
researcher includes them in the OT decision process because they encourage the decision-
maker to reflect on introspective factors. The decision-maker has to review the decision 
process and ensure alternatives are not being excluded due to personal abilities, as a 
decision-maker, through tunnel vision or by having implicit favorites. 
d. Personal Ability of Decision-Maker 
Managers often rely on their intuition or judgment rather than hard data to 
make decisions. Due to 'the unstructured nature of OTs, decision-makers must rely more 
heavily on their judgment. Those empowered with the OT decision should have business 
sense and possess sound judgment. 
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e. Tunnel Vision 
Tunnel vision is seeing a situation with mental blinders that restrict, 
consciously or unconsciously, the number of alternatives to consider. This perspective is 
in sharp contrast with the perception of an OT as a "blank sheet of paper." Decision-
makers have to ensure tunnel vision does not creep into the OT decision process. 
f. Implicit Favorites 
Decision-makers have to be careful not to favor an alternative too early in 
the decision process because they may reject a better solution. This can be seen from ' 
both sides, either favoring an OT over other instruments or favoring standard contracts 
over OTs. Either perspective limits the options available to the decision-maker and may 
result in not selecting the best instrument. 
These secondary factors, though not as important as the primary factors, 
serve a purpose. The secondary .factor~ force the decision-maker to evaluate factors 
outside the project to determine when to use OTs. First, decision-makers need to include 
input from program management and DCMC to determine if an OT is appropriate and to 
ac?ieve a better agreement. Second, consider if flexibility is needed in the terms and 
conditions to attract some of the best Science and Technology firms. Third, DoD buying 
organizations must be willing to use OTs and be willing to rely on the judgment of their 
key acquisition officials to determine the right time to use them. Lastly, whoever is 
entrusted with the OT decision should be competent and pos.sess good business judgment. 
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3. Internal Influences 
The data from the interviews reveal three influences, internal to the organization, 
that affect the OT decision process: the command culture, resistance to change and 
familiarity with OTs. A discussion of each follows. 
a. Command Culture 
From the data presented in Chapter IV, it appears that command culture 
contributed to the identification of barriers to using OTs. Nine of the ten respondents that 
identified no barriers to using OTs came from small buying commands that engaged in 
cutting-edge technology. These smaller commands more readily embraced change than 
their larger counterparts. 
The command culture also shaped the formality of the OT decision 
process. The smaller commands had an' informal process that involved the Director or 
Deputy Director of Contracting, PCOs and legal counsel. The larger commands had, 
more formal decision processes that required the submission of Determination and 
Findings (D&Fs) or Business Decision Documents. 
h. Cultural Resistance to Change' 
Another internal influence that affects the OT decision process is a cultural 
resistance to change. Changing behavior is difficult because, by nature, individuals are, 
risk adverse. Buying commands that demonstrate a propensity toward change are more 
likely to accept OTs as a viable instrument. 
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c. Unfamiliarity with OTs 
DoD is still learning to use OTs. A 1998 GAO Report indicated that as of 
FY97, 161 OTs had b~en issued by DoD buying commands. The newness of this 
instrument may cause some buying commands to hesitate using it. Those same buying 
commands that embraced change will have similar success developing PC Os ' experience 
in using OTs. The larger DoD buying commands need to encourage use of OTs when 
appropriate. As DoD buying commands continue to use OTs the resistance to change and 
. . 
unfamiliarity with OTs will be reduced. 
4. External Influences 
Influences on the OT decision do not solely come from the within the 
organization. Decision-makers should recognize external influences, including politics, 
customers and legal considerations. 
a. Politics 
DoD is not immune to political influences. Politics does not just mean the 
influences of Congress. Buying commands should also consider the political elements 
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and within their Services. They 
should identify and foster support for their projects, but also recognize there will be 
opponents. How well the political process is managed could determine the success of 
OTs. 
The authority to use OTs was granted under 10 U.S.C. 2371. In general, 
Congress has viewed favorably DoD's use of OTs for research. Congress has 
permanently legislated the authority for DoD to conduct OTs for research. Congress does 
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not hold the same view for DoD's use of OTs for prototypes. Congress has not granted 
permanent legislation, but extended DoD's authority to use OTs for prototypes on a trial 
basis until FYOl. Members of Congress have expressed concern DoD was using OTs for 
prototypes to circumvent the acquisition system's management controls. Those buying 
commands using OTs or considering their use, should recognize Congressional interest in 
OTs is high and ensure their decisions to use OTs correspond to the intent of Congress. 
h. Customers 
Before discussing the influence of customers, buying commands have to 
identify who are their customers. Buying commands have at least two customers: the 
users and program managers (PMs). Buying commands will be infl'\. ':1ced by both in the 
OT decision process. The users want the most technologically cap;:, weapon systems. 
PMs want to satisfy the user, but must also balance the acquisition and life-cycle costs of 
the weapon systems. For their influence. to be meaningful, both customers need to be 
educated in what are OTs and why they should be or not be used. 
c. Legal Considerations 
OTs are not a panacea. OTs are limited in their use to research and 
prototype products. Part of the education process discussed in the previous paragraph 
should include the legal limits of using this instrument. To ensure proper use of OTs, 
decision-makers should understand the laws associated with OTs and the intent behind 
the laws. 
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One area that requires clarification is the area of prototypes. There is a 
growing difficulty distinguishing between a prototype and a production unit. Without 
clarification, it poses a barrier to some buying commands in using OTs. 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, the OT Decision Model presented in this chapter revolves around the . 
business decision. The Model provides a descriptive decision process that recognizes the 
unique nature of OTs and importance of judgment. Five primary factors were identified: 
(1) nature of the project, (2) attract non-traditional firms, (3) dual-use technology, (4) cost 
share arrangement and (5) risk analysis. Each of these factors should be considered for 
every OT considered. 
The Model further identified secondary factors that the decision-maker should 
consider that are outside the OT itself. The six identified factors are: (1) program 
management involvement, (2) flexibility, (3) to gain experience, (4) personal ability of 
the decision-maker, (5) tunnel vision and (6) implicit favorites. 
Decision-makers should also realize there are internal and external influences that 
affect the OT decision process. The researcher identified three in each. Within the 
organization, the corporate culture, cultural resistance to change and. the unfam.iliarity of 
OTs influence acceptance and use of this new instrument. Politics, customers and legal 
considerations should be recognized as external influences. The decision-makers that 
carefully consider these factors and weigh them with the influences will make the better 
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business decisions. Chapter VI will present the researcher's conclusions, recommenda-
tions and identify areas for further research. 
108 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research effort was to develop a decision model on when to 
use other transactions (OTs) at DoD buying commands. The researcher presents 
conclusions on the OT decision process and makes recommendations on improving the 
process at DoD buying commands. The final part of the chapter answers the research 
questions. . 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Other Transaction Decision Model Revolves Around the Business 
Decision 
This study determined that the decision process' fqr deciding when to use OTs at 
DoD buying commands centered on the business decision. The business decision 
determines whether or not an OT should be used. The researcher developed an OT 
Decision Model that identified five principal and six secondary factors to consider in 
determining a good business decision. The five principal criteria are: nature of the 
product, attract non-traditional defense firms, pursue dual-use technology, cost share 
arrangement and risk analysis. The secondary factors are: involvement of Government 
personnel, to achieve flexibility, to gain experience, personal ability of the decision-
maker, tunnel vision and implicit favorites. In achieving a good business decision, the 
decision-maker should identify the objective of the requirement and analyze if an OT is 
the appropriate instrument to facilitate the agreement between the Government and the 
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other party. This analysis requires an understanding of OTs, their limitations, their 
benefits, and associated risks. 
Ols are defined as other than contracts, grants or cooperative agreements. Ihe 
rules and regulations that apply to these instruments, such as, the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DF ARS) do not. 
apply to Ols. Congress established the authority to use Ols to provide Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Services maximum flexibility to 
pursue research and development (R&D) efforts with commercial industry without the 
traditional Government contracting rules and regulations. Ols are intended to increase 
DoD's access to advanced technology, particularly by firms that traditionally do not 
participate in DoD business; influence commercial R&D into dual-use projects; and 
reduce DoD's life-cycle costs of its weapon systems. 
However, this freedom from traditional contracting rules and regulations, also 
introduces potential risks to the Government in the areas of Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) and terminations. Ols provide for the negotiation of IPRs when its achieves the 
. objectives of the program and is in the best interests of the Government. The downside 
of negotiating IPRs is that the Government could place itself in a disadvantageous 
position if the project was to go into production. Ols also provide for the other party to 
terminate for its convenience after notifying the Government. If the other party elects to 
terminate, the Government may have very little to show for its·investment. Ihe business 
decision must weigh both the benefits and the risks of using Ols. 
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2. There Exists Consistency Among DoD Buying Commands, Regardless 
of Size, On What Are Their Command's Principal Objectives of Using 
"Other Transactions" 
This study asked ten DoD buying commands, of varying sizes, what were their 
principal objectives using OTs. Their responses revealed consistencies among the DoD 
buying commands. The ten buying commands clearly identified four primary objectives 
of using OTs: be a good business decision, provide flexibility in the tenns and conditions, 
attract non-traditional defense finns and pursue dual-use technology. The significance of , 
the consistency between buying commands is that it reflects a common understanding of 
what the commands hoped to achieve by using OTs. If the commands identify the same 
objectives for using OTs, the more likely they will use the instrument as it was intended 
to be used. 
3. Command Culture Determined the Extent of Barriers in Using 
"Other Transactions" 
This study revealed that the command culture within a DoD buying command 
detennined the existence of barriers to using OTs. Of those respondents that identified no 
barriers existed in using OTs, 90 percent came from small buying commands- that 
engaged in high-risk, high-payoff projects. These commands, such as DARPA, were 
intentionally small to allow for flexibility. They were committed to frequent turnover of 
projects and personnel to bring in fresh ideas and prevent retrenchment of procedures and 
policies. In contrast, the larger buying commands did identify barriers to using OTs. A 
111 
command culture than encourages flexible and innovative thinking will have less 
problems implementing new processes, such as the use of OTs. 
4. . Internal Barriers to Using "Other Transactions" Will Be Reduced As 
They Are Used More Frequently 
This study identified two internal barriers to using OTs within DoD buying 
organizations: cultural resistance to change and familiarity with using OTs. OTs are new 
instruments within DoD buying commands that require PCOs to learn a new process. 
Changing behavior is difficult because individuals are inherently risk-adverse. There is a 
natural reluctance to venture from the known to the unknown. 
Organizations can encourage or discourage change to occur. This study revealed 
that the size of the buying command had influence on the identification of barriers using 
OTs. Those smaller organizations that embraced change did not identify barriers, internal 
or otherwise, in using OTs, while the larger DoD buying commands did identify barriers. 
The larger buying commands must be willing to encourage and influence their decision-
makers to use OTs. 
Another way to reduce this reluctance to change and to gain experience using OTs 
is to require the buying command to use OTs. Dual Use Science and Technology (DU 
S&T) Program requires the DoD buying commands to use OTs or cooperative 
agreements for their FY99 projects. By requiring OTs to be used in these projects, DU 
S&T Program assumes the responsibility of the OT decision process and encourages 
these buying commands to use this instrument to foster innovative agreements with 
commercial industry. As the buying commands develop experience and familiarity with 
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using OTs, they will become less resistant to use these instruments in the future. 
Therefore, the internal barriers will be reduced as the buying commands increase their use 
ofOTs. 
5. External Barriers to Using OTs Will Not Be Reduced, Even With 
More Frequent Use of OTs 
This study identified four external barriers to using OTs: regulations, inability to 
, 
use OTs for production, prototype definition and program default risk. Of those four, the 
first three barriers to using OTs will not be reduced with increased use of OTs. These 
barriers are outside the control of the buying organizations. Reducing these barriers 
would required changes in the statute; 10 U.S.C. 2371, and a decrease in the rate of 
technological advances. Both changes are unlikely in the near future. 
Section 218 of the FY99 Defense Authorization. Bill extended OT authority to 
engage in prototype projects,directly relevant to weapon systems, until FYOl .. Based on 
the language within the bill, it is unlikely Congress will make any changes to expand the 
authority to include production. In this bill, Congress cited concerns that DoD not use 
OT authority for prototype projects that circumvent the acquisition management controls 
already in place. Rather than permanently legislate OT authority for prototype projects, 
as they did for research projects, Congress merely extended it on trial basis for two more 
years. Congress' lukewarm response does not promote a sense of stability for using OTs 
for prototype projects in the future. 
The second barrier identified is the inability to use OTs for production. DARPA 
has argued for expanding OT authority to include production, seamlessly transitioning 
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:from prototype into production and sustaining the efficiencies achieved during prototype 
development. The nature, of the language in the FY99 Defense Authorization Bill 
indicates Congress is leaning more toward limiting OT authority than expanding this 
authority to include production. 
The third external barrier to using OTs, that will not be reduced with increased 
use of OTs, is the difficulty distinguishing a prototype unit from a production unit. This 
distinction was identified by some of the buying commands as limiting their use of OTs. 
The distinction will continue to blur as technology continues to advance. 
6. Structure For Approving "Other Transactions" Is Consistent Among 
DoD Buying Commands 
This study indicates that DoD buying commands have a similar organizational 
structure for approving OTs. All commands interviewed had an approval process where 
the PCOs brought up the decision to the Director or Deputy Director of Contracting for 
approval. Legal was involved in the decision process and, in some cases, the Program 
Manager (PM) and Defense Contracting Management Command (DCMC) were 
consulted. Th~ significance of a consistent process to approve OTs is that it demonstrates 
an oversight mechanism is in place within DoD buying commands to decide when it is 
appropriate to use OTs. 
Buying commands did, however, differ in the formality of the decision process. 
The larger ,organizations' had a much more formal approval process than the smaller 
buying commands. The larger commands' approval process was very similar to the 
process used for FAR-type cohtracts. A Determination and Finding (DNF) or Business 
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Decision Document was required to justify why an OT would be the best instrument in 
this case and what benefits would accrue from the use of an OT. The smaller 
organizations had a more informal process where the decision was discussed among the 
Director, PCO and legal counsel. Despite the informal nature of the decision process, the 
approval structure and the people involved in the approval process were similar to the 
larger organizations. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Larger DoD Buying Commands Should Delegate the Authority to Use 
OTs Down to Their Field Organizations and Research Centers 
Smaller commands are more flexible and are able to implement change within 
their organizations ~th less resistance. Some of these activities are already engaged in 
the pursuit of advanced technology and have experience using cooperative agreements. 
By providing these activities with the authority to use OTs, the larger buying commands 
would be enabling their smaller field offices to perform more effectively. OTs would 
provide these smaller organizations a flexible tool to attract non-traditional defense firms. 
The larger DoD buying organizations should use Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) 
China Lake as an example of successful delegation of authority to use OTs to a field 
organization. 
2. Clarify the Differences Between Prototype and Production to Facili-
tate Greater Use of "Other Transactions" 
As technology continues to advance, the line between a prototype unit and 
production unit will continue to blur, particularly in the computer field. OTs are 
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currently prohibited from being used for production. This prohibition on using OTs for 
production could have negative impact on the use of OTs for prototype projects. In fact, 
some interview respondents indicated that they did not use an OT fof a specific prototype 
project because the project too closely resembled a low-rate initial production unit. If 
DoD buying commands are having difficulty making the distinction between a prototype 
and production unit, they may be less likely to elect to use an OT over another instru-
ment. 
The researcher recommends that DoD develop a new definition of prototype, in 
light of the technological advances, that shows a clear distinction between prototype and 
production units. Clearly distinguishing between the two will prevent potential misuse of 
an OT and will encourage use of OTs. DoD buying commands should not have to reject 
using OTs for a viable project because the distinction between prototype and production 
was too narrow. 
3. Implement Industry Briefings to Promote the Use of OTs Within 
Commercial Industry 
The researcher found during data collection that some firms within commercial 
industry do not fully understand OTs. Commercial firms do understand that the rules and 
regulations that apply to traditional contracts do not apply to OTs, but did not clearly 
distinguish OTs from cooperative agreements. To encourage commercial firms to 
participate in OTs, DoD needs to educate them in the use of OTs. The researcher 
recommends DoD provide industry briefings to clarify what projects DoD envisions are 
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applicable to OTs, what DoD hope to achieve through OTs and why the use of an OT 
facilitates in a better agreement between DoD and commercial industry. 
4. Educate DoD Acquisition Professionals in the Use of OTs 
Congress has granted permanent authority to DARPA and the Services to use OTs 
for research projects. Congress has also extended authority on trial-basis for DARPA and 
the Services to use OTs for prototype projects through FYO 1. Continued Congressional 
support of this instrument requires that OTs be used when appropriate. This 
"appropriate" determination will require the application of sound judgment, experience 
and business acumen by individuals within DoD buying commands, skills that are not 
inherent within individuals. DoD buying commands must be committed to developing 
the judgment of their acquisition professionals. 
First, DoD buying commands should provide the educational framework, 
classroom and on-the-job training, to develop the knowledge of their decision-makers in 
the use of OTs. Second, these commands need to encourage and foster the use of 
judgment through the issuance of guidance rather than procedures. Third, these 
commands need to recognize and reward good judgment. Lastly, these buying commands 
should include the stakeholders as integral elements in the OT decision process. The 
decision-makers should include the Directors of Contracting, PMs, PC Os, legal counsel. 
and DCMC. By providing the necessary education, encouraging the use of judgment, 
rewarding those who make good business decisions and including all stakeholders, DoD 
buying commands will make the right decisions in regard to the use of OTs. 
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D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Subsidiary Research Question: What Are the Essential Elements of an 
Other Transaction? 
An "other transaction" is defined by what it is not. An OT is not a contract, grant 
or cooperative agreement, but a distinct class of transactions. There are two types of 
OTs: research and prototype. Research OTs are used to advance and support research 
projects for other than the direct benefit of the Federal Government. Research OTs 
require a 50 percent cost share, to the maximum extent practicable, between the 
Government and the other party. They may be used when a contract, grant or cooperative 
agreement is not feasible. 
In contrast to research OTs, prototype OTs are used to directly benefit the Federal 
Government, the cost share provision is not required and the instrument may be used 
even if contract, grant or cooperative agreement are feasible. 
Authority to use OTs for basic, applied and advanced research was granted in 
1989 to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under 10 U.S.C. 2371. 
It was further' extended to. the Military Departments under the FY92/93 Defense 
Authorization Bill. Congress expanded the authority to include prototypes directly 
relevant to weapon systems deVelopment in 1994 under Section 845 of the FY94 Defense. 
Authorization Bill. This expanded authority was only applied to DARPA. In 1997, 
Congress extended this prototype authority to the Military Departments under the FY97 
Defense Authorization Bill. OTs are intended to stimulate and support R&D, attract non-
traditional defense firms and reduce life cycle costs of DoD weapon systems. 
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2. Subsidiary Research Question: What Policies and Restrictions Limit 
the Use of Other Transactions at DoD Buying Commands? 
The researcher found six limitations to using OTs at DoD buying commands, two 
internal to the organization and four outside the organization. The internal barriers were: 
(1) cultural resistance to change and (2) lack of familiarity with OTs. The external 
barriers identified were: (1) regulations, (2) inability to use OTs for production, (3) 
prototype definition and (4) program default risk. 
3. Subsidiary Research Question: What Are Essential Elements of a 
Decision Model? 
Theoretical decision models are intended to assist managers in understanding the 
decision process. Three 'decision models were presented i:n this research effort: a Rational 
Decision Model, a Descriptive Decision Model and Contract Type Selection Model. 
A Rational Decision Model describes the decision prpcess that leads to an optimal 
solution. Six steps are identified in this model: (1) identify the problem, (2) identify 
criteria, (3) weight criteria, (4) identify alternatives, (5) evaluate alternatives and (6) 
select the 'optimal solution. 
A Descriptive Decision Model describes how decisions are actually made. This 
Model recognizes the bounded nature of human rationality and describes the decision 
process within this context. Managers operate in complex environments with finite, 
personal abilities. They often rely oIJ, heuristics, or "rules of thumb" to manage in this . 
environment. To be effective, managers should recognize the presence and limitations of 
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heuristics, understand factors that influence decision-making and apply this knowledge to 
improve their decision-making. 
A Contract Type Selection Decision Model describes the steps involved in 
selecting a contract type at Government buying commands. The contract type selected 
should be one that reasonably allocates the risks identified between the contractor and the 
Government and provides incentive for the contractor to achieve or exceed specific 
performance obj ectives. 
All three models describe the managers' decision-making process. Understanding 
the process and how the decision-makers interact within the process, can improve their 
own decision-making and lead to better decisions. 
4. Subsidiary Research Question: What Are the Principal Objectives of 
DoD Buying Commands in Using Other Transactions? 
DoD buying commands identified nine principal objectives of using OTs. The 
four top objectives identified by DoD buying commands are: (1) a good business 
decision, (2) attract non-traditional defense firms, (3) instill flexibility in the acquisition 
process and (4) pursue dual-use technology. There was a clear consensu's among DoD 
buying commands on what they hope to achieve through OTs. 
5. What Principal Decision Criteria Did DoD Buying Commands 
Identify In Determining When to Use Other Transactions? 
.. The respondents identified nine principal decision criteria. The top five decision 
criteria used by DoD buying commands in determining when to use OTs are: (1) reflect 
good business judgment, (2) attract non-traditional defense firms, (3) nature of the 
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product, (4) pursue dual-use technology and (5) cost share arrangement. The researcher 
determined of those five, the primary decision criterion was the business decision. The 
other four represented primary factors to consider in the business decision. 
6. Primary Research Question: What Are the Principal Decision 
Criteria to Determine When to Use Other Transactions? 
The researcher found that the OT Decision Model revolved around the business 
decision. Five principal decision criteria were identified by the researcher: (1) nature of 
the product; (2) non-traditional defense firms, (3) dual-use technology, (4) cost share 
arrangement and (5) risk analysis. Four ofthefive decision criteria were identified by the 
respondents from the DoD buying commands. The fifth criterion was included by the 
researcher to ensure the decision-makers conducted risk analysis before making the 
business decision. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Develop Performance Measurements to Determine If Other Trans-
actions Are Achieving Their Objectives 
This study focuses on developing a Decision Model on when to use OTs. How 
effective was that decision? The researcher recommends developing performance 
measurements, both quantitative and qualitative, to determine if other transactions are 
achieving the objectives identified by the DoD buying commands. 
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2. How Well Have DoD Buying Commands Administered Other Trans-
actions? 
This study revealed that DCMC was not always included in the up-front decision 
process on when to use OTs. Yet DCMC is responsible for administering the OTs once 
they are issued. Therefore, it is recommended that the administration of OTs be 
researched to determine if early involvement by DCMC in the OT process would benefit 
the administration of DTs. 
3. What Are Common Heuristics, or "Rules Of Thumb" In Using Other 
Transactions? 
This study revealed that decision-makers use heuristics to manage in a complex 
environment. Heuristics, however, have biases that could cause the decision-maker to 
make a faulty decision. It would be worthwhile to identify what common heuristics and 
associated biases are used in the OT process. 
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APPENDIX. INTERVIEWS WITH ACQUISITION PROFESSIONALS 
1. Amster, B., Legal Counsel, SPA W AR, San Diego, CA, 25 September 1998. 
2. Bocar, G., Legal" Counsel, NSWC China Lake, China Lake, CA, 23 September 
1998. 
3. Booth, L., Policy, Defense Procurement, Washington, D.C., 7 October 1998. 
4. Boyer, L., Division Director of Contracts, ONR, Washington, D.C., 28 October 
1998. 
5. Branch, E., SES, ASN(RDA(DABM)), Washington, D.C., 16 Oc~ober 1998. 
6. Cotner, M., Contracting Officer, SPA W AR, San Diego, CA, 10 August 1998. 
7. Cowley, M., CAPT, USN, Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR 2.0), Patuxent 
River, MD, 9 November 1998. 
8. Davis, T., Contracting, SPA WAR, San Diego, CA, 10 August 1998. 
9. Dellomo, A., Contracting Officer, Army Electronic Command, Monmouth, NJ, 18 
September 1998. . 
10. Duanes, J., Legal Counsel, OSP, Washington, D.C., 14 October 1998. 
11. Fasini, S., Contracting Officer, NA V AIR, Patuxent River, MD, 28 October 1998. 
12. Fisher, A., Contracting, NA VAIR, Patuxent River, MD, 14 September 1998. 
13. Freeman, L., Contracting Officer, NSWC China Lake, China Lake, CA, 28 
September 1998. . 
14. Furman, V., Contracting Officer, .NAV AIR, Patuxent River, MD, 14 October 
1998 .. 
15. Gilligan, D., Contracting Officer, Army Electronic Command, Monmouth, NJ, 28 
September 1998 .. 
16. Ginman, R., RADM, ASN(RDA(ABM)), Washington, D.C., September 1998. 
17. Gnerlich, J., Legal Counsel, ONR, Washington, D.C., 13 November 1998. 
18. Herbst, M., Policy, Defense, Research & Engineering (DR&E), Washington, 
D.C., 21 September 1998. 
123 
19. Jones, M., LCDR, USN, Contracting Officer, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA), Washington, D.C., 17 September 1998. 
20. Lake, S., Army Research and Development (SARDA) Washington, D.C., 15 
September 1998. 
21. Lamade, S., SES, Deputy Director of Contracting, Naval Space and Warfare 
Systems Command (SPA WAR), San Diego, CA, 25 September 1998. 
22. McCullough, L., Division Director of Contracting, ONR, Washington, D.C., 16 
October 1998. 
23. McLaury, L., Contracting Officer, SPA WAR, San Diego, CA, 10 August 1998. 
24. Nichols, S, Contracting Officer, NA V AIR, Patuxent River, MD, 13 October 1998. ' 
25. Nurse, C:, Contracting Officer, DARPA, Washington, D.C., 14 October 1998. 
26. Packman-Simms, L., Contracting Officer, Army Electronic Command, 
Monmouth, NJ, 28 September 1998. 
27. Padilla, D., Director of Contracting, Office of Naval Research, Washington, D.C., 
21 September 1998. 
28. Patanito, P., Director Contracting, Dual Use Science and Technology Program, 
DDR&E, Washington, D.C.; 13 November 1998. 
29. Paul, R., Contracting" Officer, NSWC China Lake, China Lake, CA, 28 September 
1998. 
30. Peek, T., Contracting Officer, Sacramento Air Logistics Command, Sacramento, 
CA, 14 October 1998. 
31. Popkin, K., Contracting Officer, NIMA, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1998. 
32. Reed, L., Contracting, Air Force Material Command, Dayton, OH, 15 September 
1998. 
33. Renta, M., Contracting Offic"er, NSWC China Lake, China Lake, CA, 28 
September 1998. 
34. Rentz, F., Contracting Officer, SPA W AR, San Diego, CA, 11 August 1998. 
35. Riffe, S., Contracting Officer, Marine Corps Systems Command 
(MARCORSYSCOM), Quantico, VA, 18 September 1998. 
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36. Schrock, 1., Contracting Officer, SPA W AR, San Diego, CA, 10 August 1998. 
37. Sharkus, D., Direc,tor of Contracting, Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), Washington, D.C., 15 September 1998. 
38. Sidebottom, D., Legal Counsel, DARPA, Washington, D.C., 2 November 1998. 
39. Sullivan, M., RADM, USN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition (DASN(RDA)), Washington, D.C., 10 September 
1998. 
40. Swatloski, R., Contracting Officer, DARPA, Washington, D.C., 28 October 1998. 
41. Thomewell, D., Division Director of Contracts, SPAWAR, San Diego, CA, 25 , 
September 1998. 
42. Ulery, S., Contracting Officer, DARPA, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1998. 
43. Wolff, B., Contracting Officer, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), 
Washington, D.C., 28 September 1998. 
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